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Ken Rutherford
CISR Director
www.jmu.edu/cisr
James Madison University | Center for International Stabilization and Recovery | MSC 4902 | Harrisonburg, VA 22807
This April, I attended the 15th International Symposium “Mine Action 2018” in Slano, Croatia. Organized by the Office for M
ine 
Action, Croatian Mine Action Centre, and HCR-CTRO, this four-day event was an exciting opportunity to learn about  fort
hcom-
ing detection technologies and current challenges in the field of humanitarian mine action. The conference gave me the chance
 to put 
forward HMA advancement throughout the years in a presentation entitled “Mining the Past for Future Mine Action Success.”
 It also 
provided me the occasion to speak with a wide number of highly-motivated and passionate researchers and program managers
, all of 
whom I hope will continue to share their knowledge and experience with the rest of the HMA community.  
Looking toward the future, others also reflect on the evolution of HMA throughout the years, both in various conferences aro
und 
the world, including at the NDN-UN 2018 conference, when CISR hosted “Examining the Past to Promote Future Success,” t
hat in-
cluded panelists from the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, GICHD, UNMAS and CISR. Similarly, our
 edito-
rial for this issue is from Andy Smith, who considers the “Evolution of PPE.” He argues that although there has been few ad
vances 
in the development of PPE in the past 20 years, improvements to procedures and equipment help mitigate hazards and redu
ces the 
risks to deminers. In addition, Smith argues that there are four needs that should be addressed: better blast-resistant hand too
ls, the 
invention of a lighter and stronger blast visor to encourage the correct use of visors, the development of flexible ceramic armo
r, and 
the ability to assess new products using low-cost tests that simulate typical demining accidents.
Our focus for this issue of The Journal is Europe. In their article, “Advanced Geophysical Classification of WWII-era Unexplod
ed 
Bombs Using Borehole Electromagnetics,” Dr. Laurens Beran and Dr. Stephen Billings from Black Tusk Geophysics discuss t
he use 
of advanced geophysical classification (AGC) to reliably identify World War II-era unexploded bombs that continue to presen
t pub-
lic safety hazards in Germany. The article discusses survey design and the challenges of applying AGC to classify unexploded 
bombs 
in urban environments. In addition, Roly Evans from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining shares 
his re-
search on the vast clearance of minefields in Denmark following the end of World War II by between 750 and 2,600 German
 POWs 
or Surrendered Army Personnel. 
From those working in the field, we have several exciting new articles. Ed Lajoie and Megan Dwyer from The HALO’s T
rust 
(HALO) discuss operations in Somaliland, including manual and mechanical mine clearance, battle area clearance, mine ris
k edu-
cation, and physical security and stockpile management. Also from HALO, Jesse Hamlin and Luan Jaupi explain how the Co
lotrac 
scanner digitize minefield sketch maps from the field for later use on desktop or laptop computers, archiving the maps as t
he his-
torical records. From Janus Global Operations, Bradley Alford, Ed Curran, and Shawn Cole examine the use of unmanned
 aerial 
vehicles (UAV) to assist in search and clearance operations in Iraq. Additionally, Martin Jebens (DRM-Consultancy) and Gi
anluca 
Maspoli (GICHD) discusses the ways in which environmental concerns can successfully be mainstreamed into mine action 
opera-
tions. Lastly, Stephen Salter and John Parkes describe the physics behind why water can efficiently suppress the effects of explo
sions. 
Their article does an excellent job explaining the science at work and suggests how to create support structures that allow w
ater to 
suppress explosions safely and effectively.
Looking toward the future, we are excited that CISR’s next Senior Managers’ Course will be regionally held in South and Cen
tral 
Asia, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, from June 25 to July 13. CISR is honored to work with a great team from the Tajikistan Nationa
l Mine 
Action Centre and other local partners. And in looking toward our next issue of The Journal, we have a variety of interesting top
ics to 
explore including a focus on Iraq and Syria, an editorial on the future of HMA, and the safe and secure management of ammu
nition. 
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PPE Development and Needs in HMA
by Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ]
A
s written in the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) 10.30 on personal protective 
equipment (PPE), “the primary means of prevent-
ing explosive injury in the workplace is by the supervised use 
of demining tools and processes that reduce the likelihood of 
an unintended detonation.” The IMAS goes on to state that 
PPE “should be the final protective measure after all planning, 
training and procedural efforts to reduce risk have been tak-
en.” To date the “final protective measure” has been to provide 
PPE that is practical but that does not provide full protection. 
The threat posed by the blast wave(s) associated with the 
detonation of high or low explosive is highly dependent on 
the quantity of explosive involved. With small blast mines, 
the speed of the blast front (as the volume of gas expands) rap-
idly declines and many deminers wearing no protection on 
their bodies have suffered no body injury despite being very 
close during accidents. The evidence from the Database of 
Demining Accidents (DDAS) is that body armor serves little 
proven purpose when the accident involves a small blast mine 
unless the deminer’s hand-tool breaks up and becomes part of 
the hazard. In any close-quarter blast involving kilograms of 
explosive, the disruptive blast forces can pass through body 
armor and pulverize the cells of the wearer almost as effec-
tively as if the armor were not there. Polycarbonate blast vi-
sors are also of no proven use in a large blast but are useful 
against small blasts. As long as the material is not deliberately 
hardened, polycarbonate can flex in a way that has often pre-
vented the blast front and associated tiny pieces of mine casing 
and unburned explosive from blinding the wearers. 
It is fragmentation that causes most fatal injuries during de-
mining. Fragmentation may come from the munition, from 
the soil and stones surrounding it, or tiny pieces of the explo-
sive charge itself. Unsurprisingly, the most damaging kind of 
fragmentation is deliberately built into the munition either by 
designing a casing that fragments or by surrounding the ex-
plosive charge with fragments of metal, some of which may be 
shaped to be self-orientating and especially penetrating. 
There are several reasons why the fragmentation threat to 
deminers has not been addressed despite the fact that even 
small fragmentation devices have regularly killed deminers 
wearing PPE. 
1. To provide reliable protection against fragments by in-
creasing the layers of flexible armor or by adding hard 
armor panels would increase weight dramatically. This 
would make the wearer uncomfortable and restrict mo-
bility in a way that could increase the risk of an accident 
occurring. Experience indicates that it would also in-
crease the risk of the PPE not being worn at all.
2. Effective fragmentation armor would have to be ex-
tended to protect the arms and legs because the spray 
of fragments is not confined to the torso. The improved 
armor would also have to cover the face and head, but 
Left to right, the image shows flechettes from a munition, pre-chopped fragments from a bounding fragmentation mine, and pre-
scored diamond fragmentation from a submunition.
Image courtesy of the author.
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effective transparent visor material that could match 
the protection of body armor is not available, so this is 
not possible.
3. The much increased costs would mean that demining 
organizations could not afford to do as much actual de-
mining—and controlling the risks faced by deminers 
has to be balanced against the risks being faced by the 
population who are waiting for them to arrive.
Reasons one and two are based on the premise that any pro-
tection is only as good as its weakest point. To provide torso 
protection able to stop the fragments while leaving the wear-
er’s arms or face unprotected is inconsistent and illogical. This 
is true, but it is not a good reason not to increase protection 
where we can because the PPE we provide is already incon-
sistent. The current IMAS requirement for body armor is a 
NATO STANAG V50 of 450 m/s while the face and eye pro-
tection is 5 mm polycarbonate, which has a NATO STANAG 
V50 of less than half of that.1,2 The V50 is the speed at which 
half of the fragments (50 percent) compromise the protection. 
So how can we justify requiring torso protection that is far 
greater than for the face? The answer is that it is not logical, 
but it was the best we could do when this part of the IMAS 
was written.
There is always a balance to be drawn between what is prac-
tical and what is ideal. In humanitarian mine action (HMA), 
we have rarely pursued the ideal because whatever we do must 
be practical. This is seen as being realistic because many of the 
hazards we confront simply cannot be protected against with 
any PPE currently available. 
For example, this KB1 submunition contains only 30 g of 
high explosive that produces an expanding blast front that is 
relatively easy to protect against at 30 cm. It also has a frag-
mentation body with steel ball bearings encased in a ny-
lon body that most body armor used in HMA could stop at 
a distance of a meter, even if the visor could not. However, it 
also has a shaped charge designed to penetrate armored steel, 
which nothing short of well-spaced layers of armored steel or 
reactive armor panels can stop close-up. 
Whatever PPE is issued, the informed deminer knows 
that it cannot provide real protection against a worst case 
scenario, but that does not mean that we should not be try-
ing to improve PPE so that it can provide effective protec-
tion more often.
The third reason for not improving PPE—increased cost—
is unsound because failure to do “all that is reasonable” to 
protect the workers could end up costing the employer far 
more than the cost of better PPE. In the author’s experience, 
most donors of HMA are open to requests for support to pro-
vide better PPE for those doing the work they fund. 
 
Why Have There Been No Significant Improvements?
There have been improvements to demining PPE over the past 
twenty years, but most have been incremental. One example is 
The images show combat body armor with a V50 of 450 m/s and a helmet after being struck by fragments from a PROM-1 bounding 
fragmentation mine. The deminer suffered multiple penetrations to torso, arms, and head and bled out rapidly. 
Images courtesy of the author.
KB1 submission.
Image courtesy of the author.
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the availability of lighter body armor materials with a tight-
er weave that allows higher levels of protection to be achieved 
in a garment of the same weight, or more of the wearer to be 
covered without a weight increase. The design of a lighter vi-
sor and some improved hand tools have also been incremental 
improvements.3 The ROFI demining face mask is the only truly 
novel advance because it makes use of a very lightweight lami-
nate named PURE, but its design has been criticized and it is not 
widely used.4
Changes to demining PPE over the last twenty years have 
been largely minor for three reasons.
1. Lack of demand. There is a general absence of an ex-
pressed wish for better PPE from the end users or their 
managers.
2. The current risk is thought tolerable. A generally low 
level of accidents has led many involved in demining to 
consider the current level of risk to be tolerable. 
3. There are more immediate ways to manage risk. 
Managing risk by making improvements to procedures 
is known to be effective at preventing injury, so efforts 
in that direction are more likely to yield immediate 
benefits. 
Lack of Demand
Although deminers rarely ask for better PPE, that may be be-
cause they often believe that the PPE they have provides great-
er protection than it does or that nothing better is available. 
The industry needs a PPE testing regime that provides a rele-
vant means of comparing one PPE product with another. The 
only test we currently have is the NATO STANAG 2920 test, 
which was designed to provide a comparable measure of the 
protection offered against bullets and fragments in a combat 
scenario. To this end, the STANAG testing regime involves fir-
ing single, carefully shaped and weighed fragments of a very 
hard metal directly down a barrel toward the material at pre-
cisely measured speeds. The test is repeated at least six times 
with each strike well separated from the others. The result is 
calculated as a V50 in meters or feet per second. 
Almost every part of the STANAG test is inappropriate to 
use when appraising demining PPE. When an explosive haz-
ard detonates in front of a deminer, the PPE is struck by a blast 
front, which the test does nothing to replicate. It is also struck 
by fragments of the ground and parts of the munition’s cas-
ing and/or deliberate fragments inside it. It may be struck by 
multiple fragments that are bunched closely together or fol-
lowing one after another. The fragments are not of a strict-
ly controlled hardness, shape, and weight and have not been 
fired from a barrel. Even the pre-shaped fragments in frag-
mentation munitions tumble in the air, which usually makes 
them much easier to stop than a directed projectile moving at 
the same velocity. However, the explosions that launch these 
fragments can generate a brief heat of over 4,000 degrees 
Celsius (e.g., TNT) and some heat is transferred to the frag-
ments, which can become hot enough to damage the material 
The images show the lighter blast visor and the ROFI face mask.5,6 
Images courtesy of the author.
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they strike by melting or burning it. It is true that much of 
the kinetic energy in any projectile is converted to heat when 
it is obliged to stop rapidly, but some fragments generated by 
mines and explosive ordnance start off hot, a fact that makes 
some PPE materials shrink away from them. 
In 2007, a European Workshop Agreement resulted in 
the publication of a test protocol for demining PPE that was 
referenced in IMAS 10.30 in 2008 but was quickly found 
to be unfit for purpose and quietly removed in 2010.7,8 An 
attempt to create a better European agreement  was started 
by the Royal Military Academy (RMA) in Belgium as part 
of the TIRAMISU project in 2016 but was not completed.9 
One feature of the planned test was the use of a triple-barrel 
fragment launcher so that the effect of near simultaneous 
fragment strikes could be measured. There would still be 
no way of recording the heat of the fragment during flight, 
but this would be an advance because some armor materials 
cannot withstand multiple simultaneous impacts as 
well as others.
The Current Risk is Thought Tolerable
The definition of tolerable risk in the IMAS is “risk 
which is accepted in a given context based on cur-
rent values of society.”10 This is taken directly from 
the definition used by the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) and was designed to apply across 
all industries, not specifically those dealing with explo-
sive hazards in countries that lack the means to clear 
the hazards themselves. Every industry is intended to 
interpret that definition appropriately in their own 
working context. 
The level of risk that people live with during conflict 
is usually higher than it would be during peacetime, 
and this is a level of risk that is unavoidable and 
“accepted in a given context.”10 When conflict is over, 
people often become accustomed to living with a 
higher level of risk than would be tolerated elsewhere. 
It is inappropriate for any humanitarian demining 
organization to adopt the high-risk mindset that may 
prevail in an insecure post-conflict context because 
it is the current humanitarian values in peaceful and 
secure societies that should apply. These are the values 
that those paying for humanitarian mine action want 
to promote as part of supporting a sustainable peace. 
Throughout the history of HMA, the high level of 
risk that is tolerated where we work has been used to 
justify using lower levels of PPE than is acceptable dur-
ing such activities as range clearance and explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in Europe and America. Early 
demining PPE was inadequate and ranged from industrial 
safety spectacles to combat armor and purpose-designed al-
beit minimal protection. 
The requirements of the IMAS published in 2001 went 
some way to level that playing field but did not bring stan-
dards up to those used in civil EOD work in Europe and the 
United States, because those drafting the IMAS, including 
the author, deemed that impractical. However, if we could re-
duce the number of deminer injuries and/or the severity of 
their injuries, it is an obligation for any humanitarian or-
ganization to do so because we must do “everything reason-
able” to manage and reduce risk of injury to our employees. 
So the current risk is only tolerable if we can show that we 
have done everything reasonable to manage and mitigate risk 
and show that we have done this in a way that would sat-
isfy a court of law. Some international demining insurance 
There are large holes penetrating this body armor material, which has 
burned and shrunk away from hot fragments from a bounding mine. 
The material had a NATO STANAG 2920 V50 in excess of 450 m/s. 
Image courtesy of DDAS.
The image shows the RMA’s triple fragment launcher for testing PPE 
with near-simultaneous strikes. 
Image courtesy of Georgios Kechagiadakis and Marc Pirlot.
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providers insist that the minimum level of PPE required in 
the IMAS is used, which implies that the IMAS level of PPE 
is broadly accepted as being reasonable, but PPE is only the 
final protective measure after all other reasonable means of 
managing risk have been taken.   
The definition of tolerable risk in the current edition of the 
National Mine Action Standards in Lebanon includes exam-
ples that may be useful to others:13
“…The ‘tolerable risk‘ remaining after an area has been 
searched, cleared and released is the risk of explosive 
hazards being beneath the required search depth in 
that task area. The ‘tolerable risk’ to demining staff 
is the risk remaining after all reasonable efforts have 
been made to train, equip and supervise staff in the 
conduct of inherently safe demining procedures. All 
reasonable effort includes the production of a formal 
task risk assessment designed to ensure that appropriate 
measures to mitigate risk are taken. All formal risk 
assessments must be updated as work progresses and new 
information becomes known. The Lebanon Mine Action 
Centre determines the level of risk that is tolerable at 
any task. In the event of disagreement, the final arbiters 
of what is ‘all reasonable effort’ shall be the Government 
and Courts of Justice in Lebanon.”14
There Are More Immediate Ways to Manage Risk
Dramatic progress has been made in risk avoidance over 
the past twenty years. One breakthrough came because of ad-
vances in metal detector technology, which meant that many 
hazards with a minimum-metal content could be reliably lo-
cated. Another was the use of small radio-controlled machines 
to process areas with fragmentation mines before the demin-
ers deployed.15 Then came the use of long-handled rakes for ex-
cavation that used distance to avoid injury when there was an 
anti-personnel blast mine detonation. Today, there is the in-
creasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with high- 
resolution cameras that are able to hover and allow the remote 
inspection of potential hazards before anyone approaches.
Left to right, the images show demining PPE used in Mozambique and Cambodia in 1997.11
Images courtesy of the author.
The images show the PPE currently being used by a demining organization clearing improvised explosive devices (IED) in Syria. In 
the author’s opinion, they are doing everything reasonable to protect their workers both with PPE and with specialist IED training. 
Images courtesy of MAT Kosovo.12
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In the example above in Raqqah, Syria, in February 2018, 
a preliminary camera overview helped to identify access 
routes and make informed decisions about approaches that 
minimized risk to the workers. The skilled pilot then used 
the camera to look through doorways and windows and 
could identify a passive infrared (PIR) triggered IED (in the 
cardboard box with the sensor protruding) before anyone 
approached. The small unmanned aircraft (SUA) gave the or-
ganization an up-to-date overview of the extent of structur-
al damage (a common cause of non-explosive injury), then a 
close-up view of visible suspicious items. They used this in-
formation to make an informed search plan that minimized 
risk to their staff. 
Those conducting any kind of risk management must first 
have had appropriate training and/or experience so that they 
can identify and mitigate risks. Thereafter, managing risk ef-
fectively in HMA relies on having as much information about 
each unique task as possible so that an evidence-based risk 
assessment can be made. The use of SUA in Syria provides 
a good example of extending the knowledge available, im-
proving identification and better mitigating risks in that con-
text. Of course the process does not eliminate risk, but it does 
show an organization making “all reasonable effort” to iden-
tify risks as they plan to avoid casualties. 
Needs
The accident record in the DDAS shows that PPE has been 
worth wearing because it has often reduced the number or 
the severity of the wearer’s injuries. Although we have nev-
er had PPE that could reliably protect against all common 
fragmentation hazards in HMA, we still do not have a way to 
assess the relative effectiveness of existing or new PPE prod-
ucts, which might do better. 
The hierarchy of common disabling injuries resulting 
from demining accidents over the past twenty years has only 
changed because stepping on a mine has become much less 
frequent. As a result, catastrophic damage to hands and eyes 
are now by far the most common severe injuries. Meanwhile, 
fragmentation injuries still cause the most deaths. 
Although there have been no significant advances in dem-
ining PPE over the past twenty years, there has been a reduc-
tion in the IMAS PPE requirement.16 The original 2001 IMAS 
10.30 PPE requirements included the provision of frontal 
throat protection and the wearing of a full-face visor. In 2008, 
these former requirements were downgraded to recommen-
dations.17 The author asked for one of these changes because 
the accident record showed that visors were not being worn 
(or worn correctly) when accidents occurred whereas goggles 
were already being used to good effect.18 The requirement was 
reduced to allow the wearing of goggles but recommended the 
continued use of visors. The downgrading of the requirement 
for throat protection appears to have gone unnoticed because 
almost all demining body armor still has a collar that folds 
back in a blast and protects the wearer’s throat. Nonetheless, 
after the passage of ten years, it is perhaps time that the PPE 
requirements in IMAS 10.30 were revisited.
There are at least four other needs related to PPE that should 
be addressed:
1. To reduce the severity of blast injuries, further improve-
ments in the design of blast resistant hand-tools would 
be beneficial, as would their adoption by organizations 
who have not yet done so (the IMAS recommend their 
use but do not require it). 
2. To reduce eye loss, the invention of a lighter and stron-
ger blast visor material could encourage the correct use 
of visors. This is rumored to have already happened; 
however, the material’s manufacture and use have yet 
to filter down to readily available and affordable dem-
ining PPE.
3. To increase body protection, the development of flex-
ible ceramic armor (e.g., modified Dragon Skin armor) 
or the use of PURE (i.e., the light material used in the 
Images from a small unmanned aircraft (SUA) show the extent of structural damage, then close-up views of visible suspicious 
items. 
Images courtesy of field operatives in Syria.
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ROFI demining face mask) would be worthwhile. This 
armor need not be able to protect against rifle fire (of-
ten approaching 1,000 m/s), but any increase to com-
fort and affordability in deminer protection would be 
an improvement. 
4. To allow end users to compare products, the ability to 
compare one PPE product’s performance against anoth-
er in a low-cost test that replicated an agreed, typical 
demining accident event would encourage manufactur-
ers to make further incremental improvements.
Finally, while the PPE provision has remained fairly static, 
the refinement and development of procedures and equip-
ment that keep people at a distance from the hazards has re-
duced risk to the deminers in many organizations over the 
past 20 years. Alongside the formal conduct of disciplined risk 
assessments, the author believes that the avoidance approach 
of responsible field operatives often demonstrates doing “all 
that is reasonable” to make risk tolerable in spite of the inad-
equacy of the available PPE.19 
See endnotes page 61
Andy Smith 
University of Genoa
www.nolandmines.com; www.ddasonline.com
A.V.Smith (AVS, Andy Smith) served as a 
PPE specialist on the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board for 
11 years and was the founder and keep-
er of the DDAS.20 He has worked in hu-
manitarian mine action (HMA) over more 
than 20 years at all levels from surveyor/ 
deminer to Chief Technical Advisor to 
UNDP country programs. Having drafted the original IMAS Technical 
Note for Mine Action on Field Risk Assessment (TNMA), he was 
contracted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) to produce current field risk assessment training 
materials in 2016.21 
Smith (front) wearing the most commonly used demining PPE in Tajikistan in 2016 – the deminers behind are wearing the ROFI mask.
Images courtesy of Major Firuz Asadbekov, Humanitarian Demining unit, Army of Tajikistan.
The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison 
University, or the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
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ADVANCED GEOPHYSICAL 
CLASSIFICATION OF WWII-ERA 
UNEXPLODED BOMBS USING 
BOREHOLE ELECTROMAGNETICS
by Laurens Beran, Ph.D., and Stephen Billings, Ph.D. [ Black Tusk Geophysics, Inc. ]
FEATURE
T
he legacy of World War II-era unexploded bombs 
(UXB) is an ongoing public safety hazard through-
out Europe, and especially in Germany. Large, air-
dropped bombs that are a legacy of Allied bombing campaigns 
are discovered on a weekly basis in Germany, requiring evac-
uations and disposal efforts costing hundreds of thousands of 
Euros in some instances. 
This article presents recent work done by Black Tusk 
Geophysics using advanced geophysical classification 
(AGC) to reliably identify hazardous ordnance at urban sites 
in Germany. After brief ly describing electromagnetic (EM) 
sensors and data processing required for AGC, this article 
will discuss survey and design considerations for character-
ization of large, deep UXBs in urban environments. 
Advanced Geophysical Classification
AGC combines geophysical sensors designed for detection 
and characterization of metallic targets with physical model-
ling of digital data to extract an intrinsic fingerprint for each 
target. This approach allows for reliable identification of intact 
ordnance and rejection of metallic clutter that would other- 
wise be excavated using conventional clearance methods 
(e.g., analog detection). Through U.S. Government-funded 
research and development programs, AGC technology has 
now matured to the point that it is mandated for munitions 
response work in the United States, and contractors must ob-
tain International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ac-
creditation to perform AGC work.1
AGC EM sensors rely on the same pulse-induction prin-
ciples used in conventional metal detectors.2 A time-varying 
primary magnetic field is transmitted into the earth and in-
duces currents in electrically conductive targets. These in-
duced currents in turn radiate a secondary magnetic field that 
is measured by receivers at the surface. In order to support 
target classification, advanced EM sensors employ three or 
more transmitters to obtain multiple looks at a target, and 
multiple receivers measure all components (i.e., x, y, and z) of 
the secondary fields induced by each transmitter. 
These digital data are subsequently processed to recover 
a location, orientation, and depth for each detected target. 
Additionally, intrinsic target parameters, or polarizabilities, 
estimated from the data provide a target fingerprint and can 
be matched against a library of polarizabilities for ordnance. 
Polarizabilities also provide an indication of a target’s size, 
shape, and composition (i.e., magnetic or non-magnetic met-
al), and can be used to identify unexpected ordnance that may 
not be included in a library.
Advanced Geophysical Classification for Large and 
Deep UXB
In the context of the German UXB problem, there are two 
main challenges to the application of AGC. First, ordnance can 
be significantly deeper than is typically encountered at North 
American military ranges. Whereas mortars and projectiles 
are usually restricted to the top 2 m below ground surface, 
larger, air-dropped bombs of 250 lbs or greater are regular-
ly encountered at depths up to 10 m. This is well outside the 
detection range of typical AGC sensors. Second, most urban 
sites have nearby infrastructure with a significant amount of 
metal (e.g., rebar, piping, etc.) that produces a strong EM re-
sponse and obscures the signal from targets of interest. Images 
1 through 4 (next page) show examples of urban locations 
where we have carried out borehole AGC surveys in Germany.
To overcome these challenges to AGC in Germany, we use 
a high-current transmitter and large transmitter loops to 
illuminate targets at depth. This produces a stronger field 
at depth than is possible with typical AGC sensors, which 
have transmitter loop sizes on the order of 1 m. Loops are 
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ideally arranged to obtain illumination of a 
deep target from multiple directions. This is 
achieved with a rectangular transmitter loop 
that generates a vertical field, and figure-
eight loops that generate horizontal fields 
(Figure 1, next page). 
The field team collects measurements of the 
secondary field induced in a buried target us-
ing a fluxgate magnetometer that is deployed 
down boreholes. Fluxgate receiver measure-
ments collected at depth significantly increase 
the amplitude of the measured target response 
and attenuate the background response due 
to infrastructure. This allows classification 
of targets that cannot be detected by typical 
AGC sensors deployed at the surface.
Typically, a prospective target is initially 
detected with another geophysical sensor de-
ployed at the surface (e.g., ground penetrating 
radar or magnetics). Boreholes are subse-
quently drilled and cased with PVC tubing 
at approximately 2 m distance from the tar-
get. Fluxgate measurements are made at 0.5 m 
intervals in each borehole, ideally at depths 
ranging down to 2 m below the expected tar-
get. The fluxgate magnetometer measures 
three components of the magnetic field in-
duced in a target. This receiver also provides 
a much longer measurement window (about 
50 ms) than the loop receivers usually used for 
AGC applications (typically extending out to 
about 25 ms). This longer window allows for 
improved target classification in the presence 
of the background infrastructure response, as 
well as rejection of fast-decaying clutter. The 
fluxgate magnetometer data does, however, 
require removal of the earth’s ambient mag-
netic field as well as careful control of sensor 
orientation during data acquisition. 
Images 1–4 (left). Examples of borehole EM sur-
veys carried out at urban sites in Germany (blue 
PVC tubes are borehole casings). The red cable, 
most evident in Image 2, shows the transmit-
ter cable, and wooden stakes are used to po-
sition loop corners. The yellow table visible in 
Image 3 is used to orient and lock the grey ver-
tical shaft, which has the fluxgate magneto- 
meter at its downhole end.
All graphics courtesy of Boskalis Hirdes GmbH.
Image 1
Image 2
Image 3
Image 4
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Figure 1 (above). Schematic of borehole 
EM survey. On the left, the plan view 
shows transmitter loops that generate 
primary magnetic fields directed in x, y, 
and z directions at the center of the sur-
vey (red, green, and blue lines, respec-
tively). Loop offsets are for visualization; 
in practice loop corners coincide. Blue 
circles show typical borehole geometry 
with boreholes offset approximately 2 m 
from the center of the survey. On the 
right, the side view shows primary mag-
netic fields at the location of a buried 
target, boreholes, and receiver appara-
tus (yellow table and downhole magne-
tometer in left borehole).
Figure 2 (right). Historical map of Allied 
bombing from 1939 to 1945, generat-
ed using Theater History of Operations 
data.3 Approximately 150 locations 
in northern Germany surveyed us-
ing borehole electromagnetics are also 
shown, with a large concentration in 
Oranienburg, just north of Berlin.
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UXB Classification in Oranienburg, Germany
Since 2014, Black Tusk Geophysics and partners have car-
ried out more than 100 borehole surveys to characterize buried 
targets in Germany (Figure 2). The work has been concentrated 
in and around Berlin and in particular in the northern suburb 
of Oranienburg. This town underwent heavy aerial bombard-
ment from 1944 to 1945. Oranienburg was targeted for its mil-
itary and logistical importance, and because it was the site of 
Borehole survey in Oranienburg, Germany.
A 500 lb U.S. General Purpose (GP) bomb subsequently excavated at this site. The target was reflected off of bedrock, resulting in 
a nose-up orientation that prevented triggering of the delayed-action fuse.
uranium processing for the German nuclear research pro-
gram. On 15 March 1945, American B-17 bombers struck the 
town in order to prevent the advancing Soviets from seizing 
German nuclear facilities.
During multiple air raids on Oranienburg, Allied bomb-
ers dropped ordnance equipped with delayed action fus-
es designed to trigger detonation hours or days after impact. 
The fuses were designed to trigger if the bomb rested in a 
Image 5
Image 6 Image 7
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Figure 3. Borehole EM data and analysis for survey shown in Images 5, 6 and, 7. Left: Borehole survey geometry with solid lines in-
dicate transmitters, and numbered stars indicate measured boreholes. The red marker indicates estimated target location; the es-
timated depth is 3.9 m. Right: Estimated polarizabilities (solid lines) and reference polarizabilities for 500 lb U.S. GP bomb (dashed 
lines). The vertical dashed line indicates 2 ms time channel for data shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Data collected in the four boreholes for the survey in Figure 3. Axis titles indicate borehole numbers. Observed x, y, and z- 
component data (dots) were measured at 0.5 m intervals between 2.5 and 5.5 m below the ground surface. Data are in units of 
picoTesla/Ampere. A strong anomaly is apparent in the data, particularly in borehole 1. Predicted data obtained by fitting a model 
to the observed data are shown as solid lines. The model predicts a target at 4 m depth with location and polarizabilities shown 
in Figure 3.
nose-down orientation. However, many delayed action bombs 
in Oranienburg ended up in nose-up orientations after they 
encountered bedrock, and authorities estimate that there are 
hundreds of unexploded bombs still present in the town.4 The 
delayed action fuses are highly unstable and can easily be trig-
gered if a bomb is disturbed.  
Images 5, 6 and 7 (previous page) show photos of a borehole 
EM survey and subsequent target excavation carried out in a 
pedestrian area in Oranienburg in 2017. Borehole data collect-
ed with this survey are shown in Figures 3  and 4. Our AGC 
analysis found that this anomaly was a good match to a 500 lb 
U.S. bomb, with slow-decaying polarizabilities that are indic-
ative of intact ordnance.
While the previous example is a clear-cut case of an intact 
UXB, the majority of targets (about 80 percent) surveyed using 
borehole EM are eliminated as potential UXBs on the basis of 
Black Tusk Geophysics’ AGC analysis. Low amplitude and/or 
fast-decaying polarizabilities are diagnostic of smaller items 
and allow for unambiguous target classification and a reduc-
tion in unnecessary excavations. This is in contrast with other 
geophysical methods used to detect deep UXBs. In particu-
lar, while borehole magnetometry can reliably detect ferrous 
(e.g., steel) targets, characterization with magnetics data can 
be ambiguous because the parameters extracted from mag-
netics data are not uniquely related to target size.5
Finally, Images 8 and 9 (next page) highlight quality con-
trol (QC) of AGC using borehole EM. In the context of con-
ventional AGC surveys using EM sensors deployed at the 
surface, blind seeding of standardized test items is used by 
regulators to verify that classification processing carried out 
by a contractor will identify all targets of interest. Given the 
size and depth of UXBs encountered in borehole surveys, 
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blind seeding at field sites is impractical. We instead use data 
collected at a test site to verify that classification processing 
works for known items; groundtruth is withheld from the data 
analyst for these data sets. In addition, we have augmented 
our polarizability reference library by collecting high-quality 
measurements with inert ordnance in the test pit.
Conclusion
Black Tusk Geophysics have extended AGC techniques de-
veloped for identification of small, near-surface munitions 
to the problem of large, deep UXBs in urban environments. 
Using large transmitter loops at the surface and receivers de-
ployed down boreholes, this technology can minimize re-
sponse from infrastructure and characterize targets that 
cannot be detected with EM sensors operating on the sur-
face. AGC processing of borehole data provides improved 
identification of UXBs relative to other geophysical methods 
(magnetics or radar) and reduces unnecessary excavations of 
metallic clutter. Ongoing work is investigating the use of this 
technology for characterization of UXBs in the presence of 
magnetic soils in Southeast Asia.
This work is published with permission from Boskalis 
Hirdes GmbH. Borehole EM data collection and analysis car-
ried out in partnership with Boskalis Hirdes GmbH and Gap 
EOD Pty Ltd. 
See endnotes page 61
Images 8 and 9. Data collection at a borehole test pit. A 3 m deep test pit is used to collect measurements of ordnance that are 
then added to a reference library of target polarizabilities. The test pit is also used to collect QC measurements that verify clas-
sification processing.
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Lessons from the Past:  
The Rapid Clearance of 
Denmark’s Minefields in 1945
by Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] 
T
he clearance of the vast majority 
of Denmark’s minefields during 
1945 was remarkable. In just un-
der five months, a force ranging between 
750 and 2,600 German prisoners of war 
(POW) under the supervision of 250–350 
Danish officers and noncommissioned 
officers cleared 1,389,281 mines from an 
area of 1,103.2 sq km (425.9 sq mi).1 Such 
speed of clearance stands in stark con-
trast with much of modern humanitar-
ian mine action since the 1990s. This 
article will explain how such speed was 
possible and why it could not reasonably 
be repeated today. The article will also 
identify a number of important lessons 
that remain to be learned.
Between 1943 and 1945, German forc-
es in Denmark emplaced approximately 
1,401,946 anti-personnel and anti-tank 
mines, mostly on beaches suitable for 
amphibious landing, but also around 
key facilities such as radar stations.2 On 
4 May 1945 at Lüneburg Heath, east of 
Hamburg, the Allies accepted the un-
conditional surrender of the German 
forces in Denmark, along with those 
in the Netherlands and northwest 
Germany. Item 3 of the Instrument of 
Surrender stipulated that “the German 
command is to carry out at once, and 
without argument or comment, all fur-
ther orders that will be issued by the 
Allied Powers on any subject.”3 On this 
basis an initial force of 1,000 German 
Image 1. Order of General R.H. Dewing  
confirming the establishment of 
Minekommando Dänemark. 
Image courtesy of Vardemuseerne.
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POWs, mostly Pioneer troops, were required 
to conduct clearance within Denmark. To bet-
ter allow for the provisions of the 1929 Geneva 
Convention, the Germans were officially cate-
gorized as Surrendered Enemy Personnel rath-
er than POWs. The other 200,000 odd German 
troops in Denmark returned to Germany in the 
weeks following the surrender.
Clearance started quickly and proceeded 
quickly. On 11 May 1945, within one week of 
the unconditional surrender, the first clear-
ance tasks had begun.4 This arrangement was 
formalized on 18 June 1945 with the found-
ing of Minekommando Dänemark by order of 
General Dewing, commander of the British 
forces in Denmark. The initial contingent of 
1,000 Pioneer soldiers had fallen to 750 in six 
weeks, most likely at least in part due to acci-
dents; the June order increased the group to 
1,892 officers and men.5 By August 1945 the 
Image 2. A Sd.Kfz. 251 (Sonderkraftfahrzeug 251) halftrack alongside members of Minekommando Dänemark erecting a minefield 
fence, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. Excellent minefields records for the vast majority of minefields enabled accurate mark-
ing and fencing of dangerous areas and their rapid clearance in the summer of 1945.
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.
Image 3. Members of Minekommando Dänemark prodding for mines, Jutland Denmark, summer 1945. Prodding was often the main 
method of detection in Minekommando Dänemark, and this was probably linked to the high casualty rate. Today prodding is used 
as an aid excavation and is rarely deemed suitable as a primary means of detection. Note how close the deminers, without any 
PPE, are to each other. Today basic safety distances, site marking, and wearing of PPE would be enforced as a matter of routine. 
Mapham, James (Sergeant), No. 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit.
Image courtesy of WAR OFFICE SECOND WORLD WAR OFFICIAL COLLECTION, IWM. 
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number grew to 2,600.6 Two-thirds of the personnel were di-
rectly employed in the field, while the remainder fulfilled staff 
functions. The organization of the clearance is worth not-
ing. The British had overall command of the demining ef-
fort from the old German headquarters on Rådhuspladsen in 
Copenhagen. Major Stanley Holland, Royal Artillery, was the 
officer in charge. Supervision would be conducted by a cad-
re of about 250–350 Danish officers and men within an or-
ganization known as Dansk Minekontrol, headed by Kaptajn 
D.A.Wieth-Knudsen.7 Working for both was the head of 
German Minekommando Dänemark, Hauptmann Geuer, for-
mally Head of the Wehrmacht Pioneer School in Horsens.8,9 
The Dewing order of 18 June 1945 was explicit on a number 
of points. First, “the execution of the work is completely left to 
the Germans themselves - they can use which methods they 
wish to take up the mines provided all security measures for 
the protection of civilians and property are observed. At each 
Minefield where mining takes place, at least one Danish sol-
dier must be in control and he is responsible for compliance 
with all regulations and rules.”10 Second, Minenkommando 
were to “complete the demining in Denmark at the shortest 
possible time.”11
The Germans used a number of methods to remove mines. 
Many of these would be deemed dangerous today. Safety dis-
tances between deminers were not observed in a way recogniz-
able now. Prodding for mines in groups without any personal 
protective equipment was routine, whereas it now only tends 
be used as a secondary aid to excavation rather than a primary 
detection technique. Prodding was also done using long prod-
ders when searching for anti-tank mines.12 
British Number 3 mine detectors were also available to 
search for metallic anti-tank mines, most commonly one of 
four versions of the Tellermine. For anti-tank mines 
that were not easily detected, such as the Holzmine, 
only long prodders could be used. A breakdown of 
the 1,389,281 mines cleared between 11 May and 31 
September 1945 can be found in Table 1. 
Sometimes highly detailed clearance statistics were 
collected and recorded. Mines removed from a pan-
el (i.e., a grouping or block of mine rows) would be 
marked as missing or booby-trapped. The same preci-
sion involved in creating the excellent minefield records 
was often repeated in the maintenance of clearance re-
cords.15 At a national level the number of mines found 
per day was recorded (see Table 1). Even today, many 
countries could not give a similar breakdown of the 
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) cleared, 
despite the huge advances in information technology. 
With pen, paper, and typewriters, better basic statistics were 
available over seventy years ago than is sometimes the case 
currently at national and even program level today.
Minekommando Dänemark also innovated in terms of the 
use of mechanical assets. A number of Panzer III tanks, StuG 
III assault guns, and Sd.Kfz. 251 halftracks, often in bad con-
dition, were co-opted into service. Typically these would be 
used as some form of verification asset after clearance in a 
form of quality control known at the time as “test runs.” Two 
types of test runs were devised: an anti-tank minefield run 
and an anti-personnel and anti-tank minefield run. Unlike 
most modern mine verification vehicles, rollers were fitted to 
the rear of the tanks. Initially rollers were made of concrete, 
Image 4. Still frame from the 1945 film Livsfare Miner showing mem-
bers of Minekommando Dänemark prodding from a standing position 
for anti-tank mines, Jutland 1945. 
Image courtesy of the Danish Film Institute.13
Type of 
Mine Model of Mine
Number 
Cleared - 
Type
Number 
Cleared - 
Model
AT Mine 452,819
Teller Mines 326,407
Riegelmine 16,519
Holzmine 85,435
Pansermine Danemark 24,458
AP Mine 936,462
S-Mine 188,835
Schützenmine 311,334
Stockmine 213,338
Schutzenmine Dane-
mak og berger (locally 
made Schu Mines)
222,955
TOTAL 1,389,281 1,389,281
Table 1. Table showing breakdown of mines cleared in Denmark 
11 May–31 September 1945.14 
Table courtesy of author.
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Image 5. Members of Minekommando Dänemark erecting a minefield fence, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. A bunker can just be 
made out on the sand dune behind the second figure from the right. As elsewhere on the Atlantic Wall, the minefields emplaced by 
the Germans were integrated into a wider defensive system and would often be covered by fire from a hardened shelter. 
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.
Image 6. Members of Minekommando Dänemark pose on the front of a Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault gun, Jutland, summer 
1945. The Stug III was one of a number of armored vehicles used to tow rollers. 
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.
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Image 7. Members of Minekommando Dänemark pose with a number of Stockmine 43s and three Tellermine 42s cleared from a 
nearby minefield, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945.
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.
Image 8. Members of Minekommando Dänemark walking the ground they have cleared in Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. The 
practice of marching in close order over land to prove it was clear was widespread in the post-war years throughout Europe. Often 
the local population would be invited to observe in order to reassure them that their land was clear. While it appears callous, an 
equivalent does occur today—sometimes a clearance organization will play football on land cleared to reassure the local popula-
tion. Mapham, James (Sergeant), No. 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit. 
Image courtesy of WAR OFFICE SECOND WORLD WAR OFFICIAL COLLECTION, IWM.
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Image 9 (top). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing cleared Tellermine 42s defused and awaiting trans-
port to a demolition site. Often more mines were cleared daily in Denmark in 1945 than are cleared yearly in a number of coun-
tries today. 
Image 10 (middle). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing a character prodding for mines. Today if mines 
are hard to detect due to having minimum metal content or are in ground with heavy metal contamination, the deminer will usu-
ally employ full excavation within their lane rather than prodding. 
Image 11 (bottom). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing the terrain of the Juntland coast.
All images this page courtesy of Camilla Hjelm.
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but these disintegrated too easily during repeated test runs. 
Concrete was replaced by steel and concrete rollers especial-
ly made at the Varde Steelworks. Fifteen vehicles are record-
ed as initiating mines with their tracks during test runs.18 
Panzer IIIs and StuG IIIs mainly only lost a track and a 
wheel. Unfortunate drivers typically experienced hearing 
damage. Examples of the patterns driven in test runs can be 
seen in Images 17 and 18.
The clearance of Denmark was costly, as was recognized 
at the time. In December 1945, Dansk Minekrontrol listed 
149 dead, 165 severely injured, and 167 lightly injured dur-
ing the demining effort.20 While the total workforce was not 
static, Dansk Minekrontrol calculated that 20 percent of all 
deminers were either killed or injured. Dansk Minekrontrol 
were keen to point out that the statistic of 100 deminers 
killed and 240 injured for every million mines removed 
in Denmark compared favorably to France, where it was 
claimed that 1,000 deminers were killed and 1,000 were in-
jured for every million mines cleared.21 
Demining was and is dangerous. In the 1940s, demining 
techniques were in their infancy. The casualties among al-
lied military deminers were also very high.22 In 1949, the 
Geneva Conventions were updated. A revised Article 52 stat-
ed that “Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be 
employed on labour which is of an unhealthy or dangerous 
nature. The removal of mines or similar devices shall be con-
sidered as dangerous labour.”23
The post-war clearance of Europe as a whole was undoubt-
edly quick, both by the standards of the day and historically. 
While hard to prove categorically, the 1945 Denmark clear-
ance operation was probably amongst the fastest ever under-
taken. On average in Denmark in the summer of 1945, 9,715 
mines were cleared daily. By way of comparison to Denmark’s 
1,389,281 mines cleared from an area of over 1,103.2 sq km 
(425.9 sq mi) by a force ranging between 750 and 2,600 
German POWs, in the Netherlands between 20 May and 31 
December 1945, the Draeger Brigade of up to 3,688 personnel 
cleared 1,079,857 landmines.24 The scale and speed of both ef-
forts in Denmark and Holland are perhaps dwarfed by those 
in France, where from 1945 to 1947, 48,000 German POWs 
and 3,000 French deminers cleared 13 million mines at a cost 
of 1,709 killed and 3,000 injured.25
In November 2004, during a speech in Nairobi, a senior 
mine action figure compared the European efforts in the 
Image 12. Dansk Minekrontrol graph showing the number of mines cleared daily in Denmark 11 May–31 September 1945. A conser-
vative estimate of mines cleared versus working days gives an average of 9,715 mines cleared a day. Such daily clearance totals are 
remarkable and are rarely if ever repeated today.  
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.16
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Image 13. Dansk Minekrontrol map showing the general locations of 1,389,281 mines cleared in Denmark 11 May–31 September 1945. 
On each line the figure above indicates anti-tank mines, the figure below indicates anti-personnel mines. 
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen, Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.17
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1940s directly to the slowness of modern clearance opera-
tions.26 Was this a fair comparison? The answer is yes and no. 
Yes in that modern clearance efforts are not as efficient as they 
could be. But no in that it is not practical to repeat much of 
the 1940s approach in the modern context. How much speed 
of clearance in Denmark contributed to high casualty figures 
remains debated to this day.27 Acceptance of casualties can be 
argued to be a contributory factor in the rapid clearance but 
it was by no means the only factor or necessarily the key one.
The main reason why Denmark and other countries could be 
cleared so fast was simple: the operators knew where the mines 
were.28 The Germans kept excellent records of the vast ma-
jority of their minefields. Wehrmacht draftsmen were highly 
skilled and made very accurate mine-
field maps. This was nothing short of es-
sential for rapid minefield clearance. A 
good example of such minefield records 
can be seen at Kirkehöje R.V.St. near 
Paarup in central Denmark. Between 
26 July and 7 August 1944, a minefield 
of 5,983 Schützenminen was emplaced 
around the Luftwaffe Directional Radio 
Relay finding station. Obergefreiter 
Busse produced the minefield record, 
reproduced in Image 14, and the pan-
el record reproduced in Image 22. The 
high level of detail and precision was 
common in German minefield records 
across Europe. This level of detail in-
cluded the location of each panel and 
the number of Schützenminen it con-
tained as well as the panel plan show-
ing which mines were booby-trapped 
and which mines were left out of the 
pattern. Such detail would be envied 
by many modern clearance operators, 
even those clearing pattern minefields 
with reasonable minefield records in lo-
cations such as Turkey and the Falkland 
Islands/Malvinas. The principle prob-
lem of modern mine clearance, “where 
are the mines?” did not really exist in 
Denmark in 1945.
In many mine-affected countries in 
Europe, much of life today carries on 
as if there had never been minefields. 
The town of Esbjerg on the east coast of 
Jutland, very near to the Skallingen pen-
insula, illustrates this point. The town was heavily fortified by 
the Germans from 1943 onwards on both the seaward and land-
ward side since any allied landing in the area would have needed 
to capture such a large port as soon as possible. Images 19 and 20 
show the overall minefield plan for Esbjerg. Anti-tank and anti-
personnel minefields were integrated to cover landward approach-
es along with various prepared demolitions in the port area. 
Esbjerg was cleared during the summer of 1945. Records 
detail 63,888 mines of all types being removed.29 Image 23 
shows Esbjerg as it is today, much expanded, with the for-
mer minefields superimposed onto housing estates, industri-
al sites, etc. As with other countries in Europe at the time, it 
was shown that the recovery from landmines could be rapid 
Image 15 and Image 16. Rollers attached to the back of Panzer IIIs and a StuG III assault 
gun used for quality control, Denmark 1945. 
Images courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen, Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.
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to a point where the legacy is barely remembered by the gen-
eral population decades later.
In December 1945, the Danes declared that 99 percent of 
the minefields in the country had been cleared—a remarkable 
achievement by any standard and one that deserves recognition 
despite the high human cost involved.30 Most mine clearance 
by German POWs appears to have finished in February 1946.31 
The only areas remaining to be cleared were in Skallingen. 
These minefields presented a particularly difficult challenge. 
“The remaining mines were laid in a random distribution 
and consisted of several types, including both anti-tank and 
anti-personnel mines.”32 The move-
ment of the sand presented fur-
ther problems. Even in 1945, mines 
that had been in the ground for one 
or two years could be found under 
1.5 m (1.6 yd) of sand.33 Movement 
of mines by the sea was also an is-
sue, just as it had been in the United 
Kingdom from 1940 onward.34 The 
records suggested around 72,000 
mines were laid at Skallingen of 
which 61,000 were cleared up to 
1947.35 Skallingen appears to be the 
one place where German minefield 
record keeping fell below the nor-
mal standard. It is also the one area 
that was not cleared in 1945. Since 
1947, a further 3,500 were cleared, 
and an estimated 2,500 were swept 
away, having been in an area eroded 
by the sea over time. From 2005 to 
2012, Denmark conducted the diffi-
cult and costly clearance of the last 
minefields believed to be in an area 
of 187,200 sq m (223,889.3 sq yd). A 
further 3,357 mines and 552 other 
items were destroyed.36
Summary
Debate will continue about the 
decision of the Allies to co-opt 
Surrendered Enemy Personnel to 
conduct mine clearance in the 1940s, 
especially given a recent film on the 
subject called Under sandet or Land 
of Mine in English. The demining 
techniques used then were far high-
er risk than those that would be acceptable now. The inabil-
ity to fully repeat this approach to some degree undermines 
direct comparisons with modern mine action. However, the 
key factor that allowed such rapid clearance, regardless of 
casualties, was the excellent minefield records kept by those 
who emplaced the minefields in the first place. In many parts 
of the world we unfortunately do not have the equivalent re-
cords that allow rapid identification of the actual contaminat-
ed ground and quick clearance.
It is clear that modern-day mine action still has much to 
learn from those who went before us, not least the importance 
Image 17 and Image 18. Test runs patterns for quality control of cleared anti-tank mine-
fields and anti-personnel minefields. 
Images courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.19
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Image 19 (left) and Image 20 (above). Original overall German minefield plan for the defence of Esbjerg. Any Allied land-
ing on the west coast of Denmark was unlikely due to difficulties in providing air cover. If such a landing had been attempt-
ed it would have required the capture of a port. Esbjerg was the second largest port in Denmark and the only viable option 
on the west coast of the country. For this reason the islands and spits on the seaward side, including Skallingen, were heav-
ily mined. On the landward side of Esbjerg and around the port itself, 63,888 mines of all types were removed in 1945. 
Images courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
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of field staff collecting sufficient and accurate data in order to 
better allow effective conduct of their operations and to bet-
ter address the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 obligations.37 The 
Germans and Danes collected better data with pen, paper, 
and typewriter in 1945 than many programs and national au-
thorities manage today with computers. We should aim to not 
only match them, but routinely surpass them. The introduc-
tion of IMSMA Core in coming years will hopefully aid im-
provements in relevant data collection and analysis. What is 
also needed is a change in working culture amongst more field 
staff so that they see accurate data collection and reporting as 
fundamental to their role.
What is indisputable is the bravery and sacrifice of those 
German deminers who, often very young, gave so much in the 
summer of 1945 in order to assist Denmark and other coun-
tries in Europe to begin the recovery from such a destructive 
conflict. I know of no memorial to these and the other POWs 
who died or were injured, in Denmark or in any other 
European country. Perhaps those who gave so much so that 
Image 22 (right). One of the panel layouts for Fink section of 
the Kirkehöje minefield. Most mines emplaced by the Germans 
would be recorded individually in a panel plan such as this. Red 
crosses indicated booby trapped Schutzenmines, blue where 
mines were deliberately not laid. Note that in this panel of 143 
mines, 19 Schutzenmines (13%) were booby trapped with anti-
lift devices.  
Image courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
Image 21. Damage caused by an anti-tank mine on the track of a Panzer III during a “Test Run” of a minefield, Jutland, Denmark, 
summer 1945. 
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.
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Image 23. Previous minefields cleared in 1945 superimposed on an expanded Esbjerg today. Red lines indicate anti tanks mine-
fields containing either Tellermines or Holzmines. Green lines indicate anti-personnel minefields containing either Schützminen, 
Stockmines or S-Mines. S-Mines were known to cause most casualties to both attacking troops and deminers.
Image courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
these minefields would no longer endanger civilians should be 
recognized, regardless of the regime they once served? 
The author wishes to sincerely thank the following with-
out whom this article would not have been possible. Major 
Peter Jegsen, Lance Corporal Preben Erichs, Dan Mouritzsen, 
Martin Jebens, John Jensen, and Antoon Meijers.
See endnotes page 61
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Field Notes
Minefield Sketch Maps in 
Humanitarian Mine Action
by Jesse Hamlin and Luan Jaupi [ The HALO Trust ]
Digital technology has the ability to bring mine-field artifacts from the field to life. The HALO Trust (HALO) has been using Colortrac large for-
mat scanners in several programs around the world, to scan 
minefield sketch maps from the field, allowing these histori-
cal records to be viewed on desktop and laptop computers. 
Once the maps are scanned, they are georeferenced in geo-
graphic information systems (GIS) to display alongside other 
layers, and used to allow HALO to build its database of activi-
ties through digitization of paper records alongside data that 
is recorded directly onto tablets.
Preserving Historical Records
A minefield sketch map is a large, A0-sized, hand-drawn 
minefield map that is drawn to scale on grid paper. HALO has 
been drawing these maps for surveyed and cleared minefields 
An example of a minefield sketch map in Cambodia from 1997. Each red dot represents the location of an anti-personnel mine 
that was destroyed by The HALO Trust.
All graphics courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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since the mid-1990’s, which included the period when mod-
ern GPS signals were not available to the general public. In 
2000, selective availability from the intentional degradation 
of public GPS signals for national security reasons, was abol-
ished by the U.S. Government under the direction of President 
Clinton.1 All survey and clearance team leaders are trained on 
how to draw a minefield sketch map to scale in the field, based 
on the specific coordinate system (e.g., Universal Transverse 
Mercator or latitude/longitude) and units (e.g., meters or dec-
imal degrees) used in country. Many of HALO’s operations 
supervisors take great pride in producing high-quality sketch 
maps, and some are truly works of art. 
Prior to clearance, a minefield supervisor hand-draws a 
sketch map for the minefield and constantly updates it during 
demining operations. The maps are also used for minefield 
briefing visits. As areas are cleared and mines or unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) are discovered, the supervisor marks these 
milestones on the map. After the minefield is cleared, which 
can take several months, a final sketch map is drawn showing 
the areas cleared, devices destroyed, and any accidents that 
took place prior to clearance as reported by the local residents. 
The final minefield completion sketch map is symbolic of the 
completion of the mined area and is used during handovers 
with the local population to explain what areas were cleared.
A minefield briefing in Cambodia is aided by the use of a minefield sketch map.
A data clerk scans a minefield sketch map from the field using a Colortac SmartLF Ci 40 large-format scanner and georeferenced 
it on top of minefield polygons in GIS.
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After the completion of demining operations on a particu-
lar minefield, each map is finalized and sent to the program 
headquarters in each country for storage, digitizing in a PDF 
format, and archiving. Each map scan is then stored on a stan-
dard Windows file server for access by staff members. HALO 
has used large format scanners in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Somaliland, and Sri Lanka.
Once the maps are in electronic format, it opens up several 
new ways to access the information. When stored on a central 
file server, the maps can be accessed by multiple computers in 
Boundaries of sketch maps georeferenced in GIS creating a nationwide mosaic and displayed in a web map. The sketches display 
once zoomed in on the web map.
The town of Anlong Veng in the north of Cambodia was one of the most heavily mined villages HALO encountered. Red dots show 
anti-personnel mines destroyed, blue areas indicate the areas HALO cleared, and green areas show the boundaries of the sketch 
maps of the minefields that were scanned and georeferenced.
36
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss1/1
37ISSUE 22.1 @ APRIL 2018
A sketch map georeferenced and displayed in a web map. Red dots are mines destroyed by HALO, skulls represent accident 
locations.
the office. Electronic format is also a safeguard against map 
degradation or catastrophic destruction (e.g., flood or fire), 
and all maps are backed up on external hard drives or the 
cloud. Lastly, maps can be imported into GIS and georefer-
enced on top of minefield polygon data for an added level of 
detail. Once several maps are georeferenced, they can be com-
bined into a single layer and published as a map service avail-
able to program staff via desktop or web GIS. This process will 
be described in detail later. 
Bringing GIS to Life
In today’s age, HALO uses advanced web GIS, high- 
resolution satellite imagery, and mobile devices to collect data 
from the field. However, there is still huge value in drawing the 
paper sketch maps to scale in the field, as the accuracy of data 
collected in the field on tablets can be subpar (plus or minus 
30–50 meters accuracy depending on signal and strength of 
the receiver). Moreover, the sketch maps provide an added lev-
el of detail typically not captured in GIS or most mine action 
databases. Verified details such as nearby villages, trails, riv-
ers, other operators’ clearance, and technical survey breach-
ing lanes can be displayed on the maps along with the polygon 
boundary. The maps also record important information about 
the approximate locations of mines destroyed or previous ac-
cidents the local community (or their animals) may have had 
on the minefield. 
Desktop GIS has the ability to georeference (that is, to align 
geographic data to a known coordinate system so it can be 
viewed, queried, and analyzed with other geographic data) 
minefield sketch maps on top of other layers.2 HALO uses 
the geo-referencing toolbar in ArcGIS to geo-reference sketch 
maps in line with minefield polygon areas. When overlaid 
with the minefield polygon boundary in GIS, a more detailed 
picture can be represented. This assists operations in planning 
future operations and understanding the nature of the threat 
on legacy minefields.
Taking this a step further, once multiple sketch maps are 
scanned and georeferenced, they can be combined into one 
layer, which displays all sketch maps (on top of the minefield 
polygons) in a country. In order to prevent the issue of mul-
tiple maps overlapping each other and obstructing the details 
of a particular minefield, each rectangular map is clipped to 
its polygon boundary in ArcGIS. After this process is com-
pleted, the maps can be viewed by data managers, operations 
officers, and program managers in desktop or web GIS, or as 
paper printouts or wall maps. HALO uses ArcGIS Server to 
publish layers like these in Cambodia for consumption on a 
program web map, which is accessible to anyone with access 
to its internal network. 
The last step is to digitize mine locations and mine acci-
dents directly into HALO’s database. Most mine action oper-
ators record the boundary (i.e., polygon area) of a mined area 
37
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in a database but rarely record the actual locations of the de-
stroyed mines, which can often be a laborious process as GPS 
coordinates need to be recorded for each device in the field. By 
using the approximate locations on the sketch maps, HALO’s 
data clerks can digitize the point locations directly into its en-
terprise database platforms (e.g., SQL Server, PostgreSQL). 
These data are then published as layers using ArcGIS Server to 
a web map (Leaflet API or ArcGIS Online), which allows non-
GIS personnel to access the layers as they are updated in real 
time in HALO’s database. This enables the organization to 
better demonstrate and understand the threat on the ground. 
Case Study: HALO’s Use of Sketch Map 
Digitiz ation in Cambodia
Landmines were laid in Cambodia during the ousting of 
the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and continued until its demise in 
1998. Through a series of dry season offensives from 1984 to 
1985, the Vietnamese military drove the Khmer Rouge (and 
230,000 civilians) across the border into Thailand. To impede 
the return of the Khmer Rouge, tens of thousands of local 
people were forcibly conscripted into constructing a barri-
er minefield along the entire 750 kilometer (466 mile) length 
of the Cambodia-Thai border, a defensive plan known as the 
K5 Belt. Further landmines were laid by State of Cambodia 
forces to defend towns, villages, and supply routes from at-
tack by opposition forces. In addition, Khmer Rouge and 
The same map with the mines and accidents digitized into HALO’s PostgreSQL database and overlaid. All of this information is ac-
cessible via an ArcGIS Server web service on an interactive web map to operations staff.
monarchist opposition forces used landmines to protect new-
ly won ground or to contaminate the interior of abandoned 
Vietnamese defensive positions.
Although 50 percent of Cambodia’s minefields have now 
been cleared, Cambodia is still one of the most landmine im-
pacted countries in the world with over 64,000 casualties re-
corded since 1979 and over 25,000 amputees—the highest 
ratio per capita in the world.3 More than 80 percent of the total 
population live in rural areas, in communities dependent on 
agriculture. Northwest Cambodia has seen a 35 percent pop-
ulation increase since hostilities ceased and this rapid pop-
ulation growth has meant these areas represent a very high 
relative percentage of the national total of mine accidents.
Despite a reduction in casualty numbers over recent years, 
Cambodia’s mine and explosive problem is still a major im-
pediment to the social and economic development of the 
country. The landmine threat is now largely concentrated in 
just 21 border districts in the rural northwest of Cambodia. 
It prevents development by hindering access to land, water 
sources, roads, and health services, and it imposes financial 
and emotional hardship on families needing to care for a land-
mine survivor.
The amount of data generated and minefields recorded in 
Cambodia is staggering. A final minefield sketch map is hand 
drawn for each completed minefield once it has been cleared of 
all known mines and ordnance. Some of the sketch maps have 
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huge numbers of mines, a direct reflection of the level of con-
tamination in the country and how dense the mines laid on 
the K5 mine belt really are.
The Cambodia program has now georeferenced all of its 
minefield sketch maps (11,762 as of August 2017). From this, 
an astonishing 164,000 records were digitized off of these 
maps by the program staff in order to create the mosaics for 
the web maps in GIS. A summary of the digitized records is 
below (numbers from August 2017): 
1 . 147, 852 anti-personnel mines
2. 1,150 anti-tank mines
3. 12,927 UXO
4. 1,858 human accidents on minefields prior to clearance
5. 272 animal accidents
HALO is working to scan sketch maps in all of its countries 
in order to preserve and digitize this important work.  As the 
technology for large-format scanners continues to improve 
and with reduced costs to acquire the technology, this goal 
should be achieved very soon.  
See endnotes page 62
A mosaic that displays all anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, and items of UXO destroyed by HALO, as well as any human or 
animal accidents recorded on the program web maps, accessible to all program staff.
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Field Notes
Mitigating Adverse Environmental 
Impacts in Mine Action
by Martin Jebens [ DRM-Consultancy ] and 
Gianluca Maspoli, Ph.D., [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
In order to help mitigate adverse environmental im-pacts, this article supports the mainstreaming of envi-ronmental concerns into mine action. This is achievable 
by strengthening existing standards, and is motivated by two 
main factors.
Firstly, an increased consideration of environmental issues 
is based on growing concerns about climate change and is re-
flected in international treaties and agreements. Additionally, 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) 
and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(SFDRR) are significantly important to the protection of the 
environment and are relevant frameworks for mine action.
Secondly, International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are 
an essential tool for mainstreaming environmental concerns, 
and in particular IMAS 10.70 “Safety & occupational health 
- Protection of the environment.”1 This guidance can be im-
proved, and this article proposes changes to IMAS 10.70 in or-
der to better reflect current needs and practices.
Why the Environment Matters
The environment is the foundation for sustainable develop-
ment and significantly influences people’s livelihoods at local, 
regional, and global levels. Over the past decades, the envi-
ronment has become a major concern. On one hand, climate 
change endangers all societies but especially those in develop-
ing countries. On the other hand, human development and 
armed conflicts have impacted the environment via increased 
pollution and exploitation of resources.2
Figure 1. Commitment to environment protection and risk reduction.
Figure courtesy of Gravitazz, the United Nations, and IHG.
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National legislation and various international trea-
ties target environmental protection, including the Geneva 
Conventions, which prohibit all means and methods of war-
fare that cause severe, widespread, or long-term damage to 
the environment.3 The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) 
account for the environment in relation to extension re-
quests and transparency reports.4 Other international agree-
ments and treaties like the Paris Agreement, the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, and the Convention to Combat 
Desertification pay specific attention to the environment. 
Their aim is to lower the risk of loss of life and poverty and 
improve people’s daily lives by advocating for sustainable and 
holistic solutions. Moreover, important international frame-
works like the 2030 Agenda and the SFDRR have brought ad-
ditional focus to the environment. 
Sustainable Development and  
Risk Reduction
The 2030 Agenda is intended “to end all forms of poverty, 
fight inequalities and tackle climate change” and the environ-
ment is featured prominently as one of the three fundamental 
dimensions, in addition to economic and social issues.5 The 
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda 
address these three dimensions and aim to shape global devel-
opment, peacebuilding, and humanitarian agendas.
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) has looked into how mine action can 
contribute to the implementation of the SDGs and how they 
can be mainstreamed within mine action.6 The 
GICHD’s study shows that 12 of 17 SDGs are di-
rectly relevant for mine action and points out 
that SDGs can bring a new emphasis on envi-
ronmental mitigation measures for impacts 
like “deforestation, land degradation, climate 
change vulnerability and loss of biodiversity.”6 
The study also identifies that mine-affected 
countries, operators, and donors intend to re-
view their mine action strategies with the pur-
pose of aligning with the SDGs.6 Ultimately, the 
2030 Agenda brings new momentum to protect-
ing the environment and calls for an enhance-
ment of the existing instruments in mine action.
The SFDRR was adopted by U.N. Member 
States on 18 March 2015 at the Third U.N. World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. The 
SFDRR aims to reduce the risks from both nat-
ural hazards and man-made disasters. Disaster 
risk reduction is not a stand-alone process, it needs to be co-
ordinated with sustainable development; therefore, SFDRR is 
linked to the SDGs. The SFDRR states that activities like natu-
ral resources management, land use, and urban planning are 
central to disaster risk reduction. It introduces “a wide scope 
that includes risk of small-scale and slow-onset disasters as 
well as man-made, technological, environmental, and biologi-
cal hazards.”7 As such, the SFDRR also applies to mine action.
The SFDRR does not determine how to manage specific di-
saster risks but outlines how disaster risk reduction needs to 
be holistic. It calls for coherence between disaster risk man-
agement policies and practices across sectors related to the 
environment, technological hazards, and biological hazards 
respectively.7 Therefore, a key element in the SFDRR is to en-
sure that stakeholders coordinate across sectors and on all lev-
els: locally, nationally, and internationally.
The SFDRR and the 2030 Agenda are highly-developed 
frameworks, forming a platform for environmental protec-
tion that should be integrated in the mine action sector. The 
driver in these frameworks is to decrease the risk to human 
life by developing capacity and to increase resilience, thereby 
creating a better future.8 In order to do so, an improved col-
laboration among mine action organizations and other stake-
holders is needed, not only through policies and planning, 
but also through monitoring and evaluation.9 These require-
ments are addressed by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) in their current version of standards on 
environmental management (e.g., ISO 14001:2015) and should 
be included in IMAS 10.70.
Plan
Do
Check
Act
Sustainable Development Mine Action Sector
Disaster Risk Management
Figure 2. Integrating mine action, SDGs and SFDRR.
Figure courtesy of Martin Jebens and Carlo Sorensen.
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Figure 2 (previous page) illustrates the need to inte-
grate disaster risk reduction, SDGs, and the mine ac-
tion sector to foster the protection of the environment.10 
It underlines the requirement for introducing the plan–
do–check–act (PDCA) principle, which is a fundamen-
tal condition in the ISO system to reduce environmental 
risks by adopting ISO standards or adapting other stan-
dards (e.g., IMAS) to address specific challenges. The ISO 
should serve as a basis for the adjustment of IMAS 10.70, 
as well as taking into account regional differences and the 
need to avoid transferring risks. This has to be done by 
assessing environmental and societal needs. In addition, 
it is important to keep in mind that planning itself is not 
enough to decrease risks for the environment and must go 
hand-in-hand with awareness rising. 
 
Environment, Mine Action, and 
International Mine Action Standards 
Mine action can impact the environment positively but 
also negatively by degrading land or giving rise to pollution, 
therein changing the ecosystem and affecting civilians’ 
livelihoods. Appropriate assessments and management can 
help in incorporating environmental mitigation measures. 
These include sound applications of the land release ap-
proach to limit heavily-invasive clearance methods and ap-
propriate remediation activities.
In 2005, Ian McLean pointed out that environmental is-
sues were “treated as peripheral” and argued in favor of a 
higher consideration, especially in the context of “main-
streaming demining with development.” According to 
McLean, there was a need to “explore the issue, raise aware-
ness, create incentives and educate the practitioners.” 11
Since then, awareness has increased, impacts of contami-
nation and clearance operations are better understood, and 
methods to reduce such impacts have been developed. The 
relevance of adapting mine action operations to fragile eco-
systems is documented, and experiences show that mitiga-
tion of negative impacts is important to ensure livelihoods, 
avoid additional environmental degradation, and take ad-
vantage of opportunities for sustainable development.
For instance, conflicts put natural environments under 
stress and contamination from mines contributes to this, 
especially in contexts where the balance between the eco-
system and human activities can be easily disrupted. This 
is illustrated by the case of Kuwait, which suffered contami-
nation during the Gulf War in 1990–1991 and went through 
clearance operations in the aftermath. The laying of land-
mines and clearance operations produced immediate and 
long-term environmental damages that consisted of “soil dis-
turbance, soil compaction and loss of biodiversity and deteri-
oration of vegetation cover.”12
Another example is Yemen, where the rural population de-
pends on a very sensitive environment, and traditional laws 
forbid the cutting of trees. Studies show that poverty is higher 
in contaminated areas.13 In such contexts, mine action helps 
to fight poverty by granting access to grazing and farming 
lands, and to sources of water and firewood. However, these 
positive impacts demand trade-offs between operational re-
quirements, local practices, and environmental features in or-
der to avoid unintended consequences.
The mitigation of possible negative environmental im-
pacts is also relevant in contexts that are not immediate post- 
conflict but where there are legal international obligations. 
For example, the Skallingen peninsula in Denmark was con-
taminated by landmines from World War II, and clearance 
was needed to fulfill obligations under the APMBC, but the 
country had to preserve the ecology of Skallingen, which is a 
protected area. A study of the environment was thus conduct-
ed, and clearance included methods that reduce the impact on 
wildlife and erosion.14
The GICHD has worked to improve the mitigation of ad-
verse environmental impacts in mine action as well. Particular 
attention was given to mechanical clearance, which is a cost-
effective method but can create adverse impacts like erosion, 
deforestation, ground pollution, and soil structure damage.15 
However, environmental considerations are not restricted to 
mechanical clearance, as other activities can produce negative 
consequences: disposal of ordnance, disposal of debris and 
hazardous waste, burning of vegetation, establishment and 
dismantlement of temporary facilities, and transportation of 
hazardous material.16 Mine action, as well as other humani-
tarian operations, has a potential impact on the environment 
due to the presence of staff, equipment, and facilities, which 
may create stress on local resources and environmental deg-
radation if improperly managed.17 
The increased awareness and knowledge of environmental 
issues is reflected in the IMAS 10.70, which sets general re-
quirements and responsibilities for the protection of the en-
vironment. It states that operations “should be carried out 
without damaging property or infrastructure, in a manner 
that minimizes the impact on the environment” and planning 
“shall take into account the effects of those operations, and 
any supporting activities, on the environment.”18 Ultimately, 
mine action organizations should ensure that the land “is left 
in a state whereby it is suitable for its intended use once dem-
ining operations cease.”18
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IMAS are a key instrument to mainstream the protection 
of the environment, and there is room for a review of IMAS 
10.70 in order to better reflect international treaties, agree-
ments, frameworks, and the current increased relevance of 
environmental concerns. Two examples—Cambodia and 
Croatia—substantiate the importance of the environment in 
mine action and illustrate concrete attempts that have been 
made by mine action national authorities. 
Cambodia
Cambodia has experienced a rapid rate of deforesta-
tion with tree cover loss accelerating faster than in any 
other country in the world.19 The deforestation has socio- 
economic consequences and increases national climate 
change vulnerabilities. Cambodia is also home of many pro-
tected areas and endangered species. While mine action often 
occurs in environmentally sensitive areas, it is important to 
take steps to avoid contributing to deforestation and the loss 
of biodiversity.
Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 in-
cludes the goal of ensuring that mine action is “environment 
protection sensitive.”20 The objective is to mainstream environ-
mental protection in mine action. The process of developing 
the strategy was supported by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in Cambodia and has relied on a compre-
hensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.21
This attention to the environment also reflects internation-
al obligations. Cambodia ratified several international treaties 
that all have links to national level planning, including the 
National Environmental Action Plan, the National Protected 
Area Strategic Management Plan, the National Biodiversity 
Strategy and Action Plan, and the Cambodia Climate Change 
Plan. These treaties implement the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change as well as Cambodia’s 
National Program to Combat Land Degradation.19 In order 
to mitigate the potential environmental impacts, cooperation 
is needed between UNDP, the Cambodian Mine Action and 
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), operators, and other 
stakeholders to lower direct and indirect negative environ-
mental consequences and threats to cultural resources.
 
Croatia
Inclusion of environmental protection in Croatian mine 
action was the result of top-down and bottom-up process-
es. There is a growing awareness of the importance of envi-
ronmental protection and sustainable development by civil 
Image 1. The need for remediation after clearance is evident from the Skallingen project.
Image courtesy of Martin Jebens and the Danish Coastal Authority.
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society. An institutional framework is now in place to advo-
cate for a higher degree of environmental protection and to 
gather stakeholders for the management of protected areas at 
the county level. 
At an early stage, this multi-stakeholder approach—includ-
ing the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), the Office 
for Mine Action, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of 
Environment and Nature Protection, the State Institute for 
Nature Protection, the Croatian Forests Company, opera-
tors, counties, and park authorities—has created a common 
understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness 
among all organizations involved.
Croatia does not have a specific national mine action stan-
dard on environment. Instead, CROMAC has developed its 
own regulations for demining operations building on the ISO 
system, particularly ISO 14001. This is in line with the nation-
al demining organizations that follow the ISO 14001 or are 
ISO-certified. In fact, ISO 14001 has become a common refer-
ence standard for Croatian companies.
When tendering for projects where demining takes place 
inside protected nature areas in Croatia, where monitoring is 
conducted by specialized organizations, operators must pro-
vide documentation on environmental protection in order to 
be selected and obtain permission for operation. An addition-
al tool to implement mitigation measures is the legal basis of 
the National Environmental Protection Act. 
Enhancing the Protection of the Environment
The enhancement of the protection of the environment 
needs to be closely related to operational requirements. On 
this point, mine action can count on IMAS as an instrument 
to strengthen the sector in mitigating adverse environmental 
impacts. The following sections outline a number of points to 
be considered in a review of IMAS 10.70 in order to strength-
en guidance on environment protection and to ensure that the 
international frameworks described earlier are better inte-
grated into mine action.
Environmental Impact Assessments
Operational safety is a must in mine action.  The protec-
tion of the environment at times will be at odds with safety 
measures, and balancing these two needs will require coor-
dination and planning among stakeholders. A thorough en-
vironmental impact assessment together with technical and 
non-technical survey can define and establish mitigation 
measures, which lower adverse impacts on the environment 
without compromising the safety of operators and cost- 
effectiveness of operations. Moreover, an impact assessment 
can help make cost-effective choices. IMAS 10.70 should bet-
ter capture the need of environmental impact assessments. 
This would also be in line with ISO 14001. Among other coun-
tries, both Croatia and Cambodia are currently successfully 
implementing environmental assessments to find optimal so-
lutions to protect the environment.
Raising Awareness 
In both Cambodia and Croatia, increased awareness 
was identified as a fundamental condition for the success-
ful implementation of environmental protection. Ideally, 
raising awareness of environmental protection should take 
place at all organizational levels, including both nation-
al and international stakeholders, and create a feeling of 
ownership for the population.22 Awareness raising should 
also identify new partners who could possibly contribute 
to the mitigation of adverse environmental impacts with 
capacities or funding.
Improved Management
Improved management can be achieved by establishing en-
vironmental policies and strengthening the importance of the 
environment in the tender process (statement of works), stan-
dard operating procedures, monitoring, and training. A re-
vised IMAS 10.70, which reflects the ISO 14001 system, would 
be a key tool to improve management. The ISO 14001 points 
to strong environmental management by implementing envi-
ronmentally sensitive policies and strategies. Environmental 
management systems result in a more systematic and cost- 
effective approach to protect the environment than an ad hoc 
approach.23
Increased Coordination
Clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) relates to the environment, is multi-sectoral, and 
requires effective coordination and knowledge sharing. 
Therefore, increased coordination between stakeholders is es-
sential and improves awareness so that appropriate mitigation 
measures can be established.
Increased coordination among environmental stakeholders 
also secures the use of existing capacities, frameworks, and 
legal acts. Stakeholders would include international, region-
al, and national environmental organizations, governmental 
bodies, NGOs, and academia. Coordination is identified as 
one of the major problems in the humanitarian sector to im-
prove relief work and avoid gaps as well as duplicating efforts. 
Coordination is thus a fundamental need to make the protec-
tion of the environment cost effective.
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Conclusion
Improved environmental protection is needed to cre-
ate a sustainable future. The 2030 Agenda and the Sendai 
Framework embody this need. To integrate both these 
frameworks, mine action could benefit by improving its ap-
proaches to mitigation of adverse environmental impacts. 
Both the Croatia and Cambodia cases illustrate that sus-
tainable development is a concern and a reason for the pro-
tection of the environment. 
Due to the diversity of environments in which mine ac-
tion takes place, environmental assessment should become 
an important and integrated part of the work. Environmental 
protection is cross-sectoral, and stakeholders’ coordination 
is crucial to address threats to the environment. Different 
actors can contribute with their specific expertise to find 
solutions that do not compromise the security of staff and cost- 
effectiveness of operations while improving mitigation mea-
sures. This is best done by introducing a systematic approach 
as is already taking place for other aspects in mine action: 
quality assurance, quality control, and land release. A man-
agement system targeting the environment can therefore be 
integrated into already existing approaches in mine action.
In addition, the importance of promoting awareness to-
ward environmental protection and mitigating adverse im-
pacts among all stakeholders cannot be underestimated. 
Environmental mitigation is likely to increase expenses and 
should be reflected in the funding due to new demands and 
criteria introduced in the mine action sector. 
A revised IMAS 10.70 on environment, which builds on 
ISO 14001, must address these issues to a higher degree. The 
revision should aim to release land so that wildlife and the 
population are not exposed to short- or long-term adverse en-
vironmental impacts while ensuring cost-effectiveness and 
the security of those involved in clearance activities. 
Ultimately, a revised IMAS 10.70 should ensure that mine ac-
tion programs return the land back as it was before mines 
were laid, therein improving livelihoods and a sustainable 
use of land. 
See endnotes page 63
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Field Notes
Clearing Safe Spaces for Drought 
Affected Communities in Somaliland
by Ed Lajoie and Megan Dwyer [ The HALO Trust ]
Governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) working in the Horn of Africa consistently identify conflict and climate change as two primary 
drivers of insecurity in the region. The HALO Trust’s land-
mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance in the 
Republic of Somaliland over the last 19 years has been at the 
intersection of these two issues. 
History of Conflict in Modern Somaliland
Somaliland is a self-declared independent republic but is 
not recognized by the United Nations and its member states. 
Located in the northwest region of Somalia, Somaliland bor-
ders the semi-autonomous region of Puntland to the east, 
Ethiopia to the south and southwest, Djibouti to the north-
west, and the Gulf of Aden to the north. The region that now 
comprises Somaliland was home to various sultanates un-
til becoming a British protectorate from 1884 until indepen-
dence on 26 June 1960. On 1 July 1960, Somaliland reunited 
with the successor state of Italy’s protectorate in the south to 
form the Somali Republic. On 18 May 1991 with the Somali 
Republic crumbling, the Republic of Somaliland unilaterally 
declared its independence and maintains a de facto state to 
this day.
The majority of the landmine and ERW contamination in 
Somaliland is the result of three periods of major conflict. 
In 1977, Somali President Siad Barre launched the Ogaden 
War against regional rival Ethiopia, ostensibly to regain the 
Ogaden territory of eastern Ethiopia regarded by the Somali 
government as rightfully part of a “greater Somalia.” In order 
to secure the border and establish forward logistics bases for 
resupplying troops in Ethiopia, the Somali National Army 
(SNA) established a series of military installations ringed by 
anti-personnel and anti-tank mines on the border between 
Somaliland and Ethiopia. During this time, large amounts of 
weapons, ammunition, and military equipment were brought 
into the country. Both Somalia and Ethiopia had been Soviet 
client states and received large amounts of military assistance; 
however, with the start of the Ogaden War, the Soviets were 
forced to choose sides and decided to back Ethiopia. Eager 
to seize the opportunity to win an ally in the region, the 
United States stepped in and began supplying war material 
to Somalia. This infusion of armaments helped fuel the next 
stage of conflict in the country.
By the 1980s, Somaliland was growing disillusioned with 
the Somali Democratic Republic as it was called after Siad 
Barre’s 1969 takeover. Power and resources were held dispro-
portionately by those in the south, while the north was bearing 
the burden of the aftereffects of the Ogaden War including an 
influx of Somali refugees from the disputed region. The Somali 
National Movement (SNM) was founded in 1981 as an orga-
nization advocating political redress of northern grievanc-
es but morphed into an all-out revolutionary independence 
movement by the mid-‘80s as the Somali government sought 
to eliminate all resistance with increasingly harsh methods. 
During this time, which is generally considered part of the 
Somali Civil War, the SNA continued laying mines to pro-
tect its bases and infrastructure from SNM attacks, while the 
SNM used landmines to ambush SNA patrols and logistics 
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Figure 1. Somaliland seasonal calendar showing the two rainy seasons.
Figure courtesy of Famine Early Warning Systems.
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convoys. Massive amounts of ordnance were deployed by the 
SNA on the civilian population of Somaliland, most notably 
during the aerial bombing and artillery bombardments of the 
cities of Hargeisa and Burao, both of which were almost com-
pletely destroyed. When the regime of Siad Barre collapsed in 
1991, SNM fighters were able to gain the upper hand as SNA 
forces pulled back.
Subsequent to independence, large scale interfactional 
clashes occurred in Somaliland as different groups vied for 
political power. These clashes included small-scale mine lay-
ing, as armed groups sought to establish control of land by de-
nying other groups’ access. The large amounts of weapons and 
ammunition remaining from the civil war added to the vola-
tility of an already unstable region. 
HALO’s Work in Somaliland
The HALO Trust began operations in Somaliland in 1999, 
conducting manual and mechanical mine clearance, battle 
area clearance (BAC), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 
physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), and 
mine risk education (MRE). HALO is active in all regions 
of Somaliland and, from 1999 to January 2018, has cleared 
2,340 hectares of land, removing 3,560 anti-personnel mines, 
1,348 anti-tank mines, 101,413 items of unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) and stray ammunition, and 150,372 rounds of small 
arms ammunition. After almost twenty years of clearance 
in Somaliland, HALO is now focusing on finishing the final 
large high-priority tasks in the country, mainly former SNA 
positions on the border with Ethiopia. If funding levels re-
main constant and the severity of the drought does not return 
to its pre-2018 levels, the clearance of these tasks should be 
completed by mid-to-late 2019. During the next year, HALO 
will also focus on raising the capacity of the national authori-
ties to deal with the remaining small, low, and medium pri-
ority tasks, which mainly consist of isolated roads as well as 
the continuing threat posed by UXO and stray ammunition. 
HALO’s work in Somaliland is currently funded by gen-
erous support from the United Kingdom (DFID), the Office 
of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/
WRA), Germany (German Federal Foreign Office), Ireland 
(Irish Aid), Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the 
Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Previous do-
nors include the Norwegian government (Royal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), Switzerland (Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs/Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)), 
Belgium (Federal Government of Belgium), and Canada 
(Canada International Development Agency). 
Climate Change and Drought 
HALO’s clearance work in Somaliland and the overall 
development of the country have been heavily impacted by 
one of the worst droughts to hit the region in recent histo-
ry. Somaliland usually experiences rainfall in two seasons 
every year: the Gu rainy season from April to July and the 
Deyr rainy season from October to January.1 Beginning in 
2016 and continuing into 2017, Somaliland experienced a 
drought caused by lower than average rainfalls for four con-
secutive seasons. Throughout October 2017, when seasonal 
rains are usually heaviest, rainfall was 50 percent below aver-
age.1 Extremely poor harvests caused by this lack of rainfall 
along with the death of up to 80 percent of the country’s live-
stock has plunged the region into crisis conditions as fami-
lies across the Horn of Africa struggled to survive.2 The loss 
of livelihoods and lack of food security displaced many rural 
families, pushing them toward populated areas in search of a 
support system. In 2017, using data from the United Nations 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) report-
ed over 242,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) within 
Somaliland.3 However, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) estimates that the true number of IDPs 
in Somaliland may be as high as 1,004,400.4 Although the 
Famine Early Warning System reports that the situation has 
slightly improved in 2018, much of Somaliland is predicted 
to have crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity between 
February and May 2018.5
Demining and ERW Clearance 
Opens Humanitarian Space
In the first half of 2017, HALO’s operations were heavily af-
fected by the drought as teams could not obtain enough water 
to supply remote camps without harming already struggling 
communities. Minefields in the worst affected areas were sus-
pended as the teams had to relocate to other tasks closer to 
areas with consistent water sources. In the second half of the 
year, HALO was able to return to tasks on the border with 
Ethiopia and prioritized tasks to include assistance to persons 
displaced by the drought. As has been observed in many other 
countries, as IDPs move into new and unfamiliar areas that 
have mine and ERW risks, they are often at a greater risk of 
being injured or killed, especially if they come from an area 
without such threats. 
In July 2017, an eight-year-old girl in an IDP camp near the 
town of Adhi-Adeeye in Sool region found a stray hand gre-
nade in an area adjacent to the camp, which was the scene of 
fighting between Puntland and Somaliland forces between 
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2004 and 2008. The girl brought the grenade into her family’s 
cooking area in front of their house and pulled the pin un-
aware of the danger of the item. The resulting explosion killed 
the girl and wounded 17 others as they were preparing food. 
HALO immediately sent a team to the area to conduct BAC 
and EOD activities, as well as the MRE team to conduct educa-
tion seminars with the civilians. HALO found and destroyed 
23 items of UXO and stray ammunition, while six additional 
UXO items were handed over by the surrounding community. 
As refugees move toward populated areas, land previ-
ously cleared by HALO has been repurposed to serve IDPs 
as a safe area to set up camp, as was the case near the vil-
lage of Khaatuumo. Khaatumo village is located on the bor-
der with Ethiopia and was heavily mined during both the 
Ogaden War (1977–1978) and Somali Civil War (1988–1991) 
to protect military camps and prevent road access. HALO 
cleared over 750,000 sq m (896,992.5 sq yd) of ground 
around a former military camp between 2014 and 2015, 
finding and destroying 57 anti-personnel and four anti- 
tank mines. The area now houses two IDP camps for people 
displaced by drought.
The arrival of IDPs in Khaatumo has increased the pres-
sure on local water sources. The villagers in Khaatumo rely on 
limited water supplies from local wells, while the IDPs must 
travel to the nearby village of Jeenyo Laaye to use wells there. 
However, these wells are swiftly running dry and causing wa-
ter prices to increase from US$2 a barrel in late December to 
$2.50 a barrel in January 2018, an enormous sum in a country 
where the average income per person is less than $1 per day.
HALO’s current task in Khaatumo is to clear the road be-
tween Khaatumo and Jeenyo Laaye, freeing up access for IDPs 
and villagers alike. Clearing the 18 km (11.2 mi) route will 
save beneficiaries a significant amount of time and effort in 
accessing the water source at Jeenyo Laaye, as they are cur-
rently forced to travel 38 km (23.6 mi) through detours and 
side roads. 
HALO’s work to open roads is also important to the safe-
ty of economic migrants as was recently demonstrated by an 
accident in the Lughaya area. On 21 January 2018, a dual-wheel 
flatbed truck carrying approximately 30 people detonated an 
anti-tank mine on a track 12 km (7.5 mi) south of Lughaya, a 
town of 14,000 inhabitants in Northwest Somaliland. The pas-
sengers in the vehicle were economic migrants trying to reach 
a boat in Lughaya town in order to travel abroad in search of 
work. Fortunately, due to the mine’s depth and standoff pro-
vided by boxes that the passengers were standing on, only two 
people were slightly injured. With ever-growing numbers of 
displaced persons passing through Somaliland from Ethiopia 
Figure 2. A map of IDP camp locations in Somaliland as of November 2017 produced by IOM.
Figure courtesy of IOM.
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Figure 3. The green circles on the map indicate minefields cleared by The HALO Trust. The red circles depict remaining road 
tasks, while the squares represent former military camp positions. Note the significant overlap with the IDP camp map. 
Figure courtesy of The HALO Trust.
to access the coast for the purpose of economic migration, the 
threat of landmines is a daily hazard and one that carries sig-
nificant impacts.
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the drought in 2016, HALO’s clear-
ance teams have released 134,000 sq m (160,262.7 sq yd) of 
land for agricultural use such as growing fruit, vegetables, 
and cereal as well as grazing land for livestock. In addition, 
156,000 sq m (186,574.4 sq yd) of land has been cleared for 
community development, and 986,000 sq m (1,179,256.2 sq yd) 
of land has been cleared to allow access for water collection, 
health facilities, schools, markets, and other aspects of liveli-
hood previously cut off by the threat of landmines.   
The activities conducted by HALO provide support to 
urban and rural communities that have a history of conflict 
or that have been severely impacted by the drought. Clan 
disputes in Somaliland are often centered on agricultural land 
and access to resources such as water. By clearing mined land, 
HALO improves access to these resources, reducing the like- 
lihood of disputes arising, which in turn has a stabilizing 
effect on the region and the country.  
Nearly 60 percent of deprived households in Somaliland 
rely on livestock to sustain their livelihoods.6 Somalis are fa-
mously adept pastoralists and rely heavily on livestock not 
only for their milk and meat, but also as an investment. In 
an environment where banking and savings facilities are lim-
ited, livestock, particularly camels, represent a key alterna-
tive. The loss of camels, when one steps on an anti-tank mine 
and kills several in a herd, can destroy the wealth of not only 
Locals returning from a watering point pass by the Jeenyo Laaye 
minefield in Somaliland.
Photo courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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single families but often the wider community. In addition to 
the prevention of accidents to people, the prevention of acci-
dents to livestock is also an important outcome. 
HALO also recruits staff from local communities, and 
with over 500 local nationals employed in Somaliland, the 
injection of money into local economies through salaries is 
significant. In areas where there are few other income alter-
natives, this approach has a proven stabilization effect on 
the entire country. 
The humanitarian situation in Somaliland significantly 
deteriorated in 2017, as several seasons of poor and below- 
average rainfall impacted food security and livelihoods, 
and the situation is expected to deteriorate further in 2018. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) stated that 
rural livelihoods are people’s best defence against famine, 
and HALO intends to continue supporting these livelihoods 
through opening access to resources and protecting lives 
and property.7 
See endnotes page 63
Figure 4. HALO completed EOD tasks in Somaliland.
Figure courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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DETERMINING THE VALUE 
OF UAVS IN IRAQ
by Bradley Alford, Ed Curran, and Shawn Cole [ Janus Global Operations ]
As areas of Iraq and Syria controlled by ISIS are liber-ated, internally displaced persons (IDP) are returning to their homes to face widespread destruction and con-
tamination from deadly improvised explosive devices (IED) 
implanted by ISIS to maim, kill, and terrorize. Janus Global 
Operations (Janus) currently operates throughout Iraq, clear-
ing IEDs with a focus on bringing critical infrastructure on-
line to allow IDPs to return safely and resume their lives.
Operating in urban environments has proven challenging 
due to the high volume of destroyed buildings and associated 
rubble. In urban environments, operators are exposed to un-
certain situations when traditional detection methods can be 
dangerous. Among the primary goals of industry best practic-
es is to protect operators by limiting their exposure to explo-
sive remnants of war, including IEDs. In a destroyed factory, 
small copper crush wires, which ISIS has used extensively for 
victim-activated IEDs, can be difficult to detect, and expos-
ing operators to this threat is unacceptable. Situations like 
this drive new innovations in search and clearance operation-
al technology to protect operators by more safely finding and 
disrupting IEDs.
Operator safety and operational quality are Janus’ two pri-
mary goals. To augment the successful outcomes of our oper-
ations and to further mitigate the risk to our operators, Janus 
has been testing the validity of adopting unmanned aerial ve-
hicles (UAV), or drones, to assist in search and clearance op-
erations. This article discusses the results from our extensive 
field testing.
What is a UAV?
A UAV, commonly referred to as a drone, is an aircraft 
without a human pilot onboard. Small UAVs are components 
of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS), which includes 
a UAV, a ground-based operator, and a system of communi-
cation between the two. The communication is achieved via 
a radio control unit that incorporates a transmitter (Tx) for 
commanding the UAV and a receiver for receiving data from 
the UAV (e.g., a video feed, battery data, and flight teleme-
try). Regulations and definitions vary around the world, but 
a small UAV is generally considered to weigh 20 kg (44 lbs) 
or less.
Utiliz ing UAV Technology in Iraq
A UAV that supports search, improvised explosive device 
disposal (IEDD), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) op-
erations in Iraq is a force multiplier. It is a defining tool for de-
ploying limited resources, such as equipment and manpower, 
directly to a hazardous area with minimal risk and maximum 
target intelligence. The surveillance data can be appraised 
and the correct assets employed, enabling operations to com-
mence in a timely manner. 
Equipment Used for UAV Operations
UAV prices have fallen dramatically, and are now accessi-
ble to most audiences. Current prices range from small chil-
dren’s toys that can be purchased for under US$100 to larger 
hobbyist machines designed to provide high-quality visual 
data that can cost thousands. Janus chose the DJI Phantom 
4 Pro (P4P) for use in Iraq due to its local availability as 
well as the rigorous environmental field testing that has al-
ready been conducted by the manufacturer and independent 
technology evaluators to validate the system’s ruggedness. 
The P4P is a small quadcopter aircraft that carries a high- 
definition (HD) camera, stabilized on a three-axis (roll, pitch, 
and yaw) gimbal, and is capable of recording video and still 
images. The P4P weighs approximately 1.4 kg (3.0 lbs) and has 
a maximum quoted flight time of approximately 30 minutes 
per battery, with a transmission range of 5–7 km (3.1–4.3 mi). 
The UAV has a maximum range of 500 m (546.8 yd) horizon-
tally and 121.9 m (133.3 yards) vertically, or the operator’s 
visual range. The UAV can fly intelligently, and has anti-colli-
sion sensors (front, rear, below, and on the port and starboard 
planes), which the pilot may use or turn off as necessary. The 
UAV streams a live video feed to the Tx, which is either viewed 
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by an attached phone or tablet, or in the case of the P4P Plus 
model, a dedicated first-person view (FPV) screen on the Tx.
The camera has the capability to record up to Ultrahigh 
Definition (4K) at 60 frames per second, but video is typically 
streamed at 1080p full HD or 720p HD if the feed is weakened. 
It is possible to take photographs while video is being recorded 
by pressing specific buttons on the Tx or by touching specific 
icons on the FPV touchscreen.
The P4P’s sale is strictly limited to international agencies 
and is available for $1,400–1,900. Replacement parts are avail-
able through a specific retailer in Erbil, and can be expected 
within 10–20 days of request. The ease of purchasing and us-
ing UAVs has, however, also been recognized by terror groups 
as well as government security forces in Iraq. Thus, the sale of 
drones and the areas where they can fly are now regulated in 
Iraq. To use UAV technology in Iraq, each site requires a gen-
eral letter of authority to fly from the local mayor or police/
army commander, and it is advisable to notify Iraqi security 
force commanders and civilian authorities in the vicinity of 
operational sites of planned UAV flights.
Evaluation Parameters and Testing
Janus conducted a trial and evaluation (T&E) in Iraq to as-
sess the effectiveness of UAV support to operations, utilizing 
a P4P Plus. The T&E took place in four typical environments: 
area search, buildings, warehouses, and routes. Trip wires, 
crush wires, pressure plates, and concealed IEDs were pre-
pared and emplaced in these environments to prove the con-
cept and to test the feasibility and capabilities of the onboard 
camera and FPV screen. The optimal operating distance of the 
P4P was gathered as a result of the testing.
Testing Results and Best Practices
The results from observing the pressure plate and crush 
wire IEDs suggest that an initial flight plan should have a sig-
nificant UAV height in order to search for associated ground 
signs first (with buried main charges likely providing the 
most easily-recognized indicator of potential contamination). 
Ground signs can include indicators such as disturbed earth, 
sight line markers, and tamping.  After a potential target is 
located, a closer and detailed look can be taken for potential 
switches. Whereas ground signs may indicate the presence of 
a buried pressure plate, the absence of ground sign coming 
from a located main charge may indicate the presence of a 
crush wire as the initiator. Finally, a detailed slow and low 
sweep of the area should be made in Tripod Mode, which is 
a setting that significantly slows down the P4P but allows for 
more precise control and smoother video footage to increase 
the quality of imagery. This is best done from four differing 
cardinal points across the area of concern. The height and an-
gle of the sun may help or hinder UAV optics and, to achieve 
the highest visibility, multiple approaches from differing an-
gles should be made.
The UAV performed well in large, open-plan storage units, 
but anti-collision algorithms prevented it from entering con-
ventional doorways without disabling this safety mechanism. 
DJI has produced a smaller UAV product, the Spark, which re-
tails for approximately $750 and is a quarter of the P4P’s size: 
20 cm (7.8 in) in length. The Spark appears to excel in tight 
and confined conditions and still has a stabilized HD camera 
onboard. The only limiting factor is a flight time of 16 min-
utes. The associated amount of hovering involved with flying 
in a confined area will reduce the flight time.  Currently, the 
P4P is still a preferable option due to its durability and skilled 
pilots can compensate for disabled safety mechanisms.
We found that a profound parallax effect occurs when at-
tempting to fly a UAV over a target more than 200 m (218 yd) 
away.1 In order to negate this, missions should be supported 
by a range finder and at least one pair of binoculars. UAV pi-
lots should have at least five-to-eight hours of flight training 
before supporting live operations. This allows the operator to 
develop muscle memory, dexterity, familiarity with the air-
craft, and patience in order to become sufficiently proficient 
with the SUAS to ensure a successful outcome.
All video footage should be recorded in 4K/2.7K resolu-
tion.2 At this level of resolution the quality of the video im-
agery is sufficiently high to pause and capture high resolution 
screenshots directly from the video playback. During opera-
tions, a detail can be spotted on a laptop monitor (not pre-
viously seen by the UAV operator), and the possibility exists 
DJI Phantom 4 Pro (P4P) Quadcopter.
Courtesy of Shawn Cole, Task Order Leader, Janus Global Operations 
LLC.
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to capture it, export it, add digital filters, and zoom. With 
1080p/720p resolution, the results are less defined and crucial 
detail could be missed. 
Further tests were conducted using the UAV inside a small 
and confined building. The camera on the P4P is central on 
the vertical plane running through the middle of the UAV. 
However, it is offset on the central horizontal plane and sits 
below the central line. This made the assessment of the drone 
location when flying through entrances with limited clear-
ance while utilizing the FPV screen awkward. After flying 
into a building, the GPS signal that the UAV uses to main-
tain position can be blocked. The UAV then reverts to utiliz-
ing the visual sensors on the bottom of the UAV body to hold 
position while hovering. Unfortunately, this only works with 
ample light available. Tripod Mode had to be used to delay the 
UAV movements and maintain maximum control inside the 
building. Any future attempts should incorporate the use of 
propeller guards. In a confined space, if flying low or moving 
through a window gap, turbulence is created from the rotors 
that results in the UAV drifting, making it difficult to control. 
If a propeller hits an obstacle, such as a door frame, then the 
UAV will likely crash, possibly be damaged and need recover-
ing, which defeats the point of using the UAV.
Benefits to Using UAV Technology
From our testing, Janus believes that there would be many 
benefits to adding UAVs to the inventory of IEDD/EOD teams. 
Their use would enhance capability, safety, and speed and are 
summarized as but not limited to being capable of:
• Area reduction.
• Confirmation of explosive hazard (EH) contamination.
• Establishing target patterns and direction.
• Investigating ground signs on operational sites. 
• Non-technical and technical survey support.
• Observation in restricted access areas.
• Protective security detail surveillance (e.g., vehicle 
breakdowns in hostile areas).
• Reconnaissance prior to entering previous work sites 
after a security incident.
• Remote reconnaissance of viable IEDs.
• Render Safe Procedure (RSP) confirmation.
• Route checks.
• Support for mechanical assets.
• Target confirmation.
• Up-to-date imagery of operational task sites for:
• Briefings
• Reporting
Limitations to Using UAV Technology 
While UAVs have proven to be invaluable tools for both 
Tests of the UAV were conducted inside a small and confined building.
Courtesy of Shawn Cole, Task Order Leader, Janus Global Operations LLC.
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humanitarian and military operations, our tests indicate that 
they do have the following limitations/complications in appli-
cation of IEDD search:
• Battery endurance (average 20 minutes flight time).
• Flying ability of the UAV operator.
• Flying over busy highways and roads.
• Flying over densely populated areas.
• Flying through small gaps and inside buildings.
• Authority to fly locally (government/police/military).
• Nighttime flying.
• Public perception – these camera platforms can be con-
fused with weapons.
• Proximity to airports and air traffic.
• Visibility
• Weather conditions (rain and electrical storms).
• Wind speeds in excess of 17 km/hr.
Technology Limitation Mitigations
A UAV operation can be time consuming, and sufficient 
battery power must be included for each mission. Each P4P 
battery has a maximum listed life span of 30 minutes; howev-
er, during testing, it was found to be closer to 20–25 minutes. 
The automatic low-battery level is signaled to the UAV oper-
ator once the battery level descends below 30 percent. If the 
warning is not heeded, an autonomous function takes control 
of the UAV and flies it back to its original take-off position. 
Each mission should have at least three fully-charged batter-
ies on-site in addition to a main charger or a vehicle charger.
Thermal imaging cameras are now available for the DJI 
P4P UAV platform. These retail at approximately $2,500 and 
would significantly increase the effectiveness of the UAV. 
When flown in Tripod Mode over large areas, fresh anomalies 
are easily spotted, subtle differences in temperatures are eas-
ily distinguishable, landmines, IEDs, VS-500 IED mines, and 
items of ERW will all hold temperature values that differ from 
the mean ground temperature and, as such, are easily spotted 
from height despite being concealed.
Conclusion
The use of UAV technology to support IEDD/EOD op-
erations in Iraq has increased Janus’ overall effectiveness in 
Iraq. The relatively small cost of implementing UAVs into 
the respective areas of operations and integrating them into 
daily operations has the potential to render large benefits. 
By training more UAV operators and integrating thermal 
imaging cameras into the UAV platform, Janus plans to fur-
ther develop the capability of this technology for IEDD/
EOD operations.
During the trial, an entry-level UAV—the P4P Plus—was 
used, primarily utilized by hobbyists. DJI (and many oth-
er UAV manufacturers) have systems that are capable of 
even more applications. These UAVs can carry small pay-
loads and have greater f light endurance, better cameras, 
and thermal imaging as standard. While the trial UAV was 
robust and performed well, the fixed FPV screen prevented 
third-party software from being used.
As UAV costs continue to decline, getting these inexpen-
sive tools into the hands of trained operators across the 
world will evolve procedures and standards, and help miti-
gate operator risk. As UAVs are used more broadly for 
IEDD/EOD operations, more innovative UAV solutions will 
be crafted that address the current limitations, leading to 
greater efficiency, economy, and operator safety. 
See endnotes page 63
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WHY IS WATER SO EFFICIENT AT SUPPRESSING 
THE EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIONS?
by Stephen Salter [ University of Edinburgh ] and John Parkes
When most experienced explosives engineers first observe an explosion suppressed by bags of water, they are convinced that there has been a misfire. Depending on the amount 
of water and the way it is contained, the overpressure can be reduced 
by a factor of ten, sometimes more than twenty.1 The number of frag-
ments from shell cases can be one hundred times less. Their velocities 
can be seven times. Slugs from focal point charges are stopped. Safety 
distances around magazines can be cut. The number of people evacu-
ated from a bomb disposal site can be reduced. In June 1999, engineers 
from 33 Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) saved an entire vil-
lage in Kosovo from the detonation of a 2,000-pound NATO bomb by 
using water bags.
This article outlines some of the physics behind the effects. Latent 
heat, fast external pressure rise, drag of fragments, momentum trans-
fer, the speed of sound in gas-liquid mixtures, and interference with the 
combustion of carbon are all involved, but perhaps other mysteries still 
remain. Some practical details of the technique are also discussed.
HEAT
The latent heat needed to evaporate a kilogram of water is 2.25 mega-
joules. The explosive energy from 1 kilogram of TNT is 4.45 megajoules. 
Water is cheap and can be affordably placed weighing much more than 
twice its weight in explosives. An explosion breaks water into a fine 
spray. The surface area of spray is six times the water volume divided 
by drop diameter and can be very large. For example, a cubic meter of 
water broken into 30 micron drops has a surface area of 200,000 square 
meters. This large area provides a splendid chance for evaporation. The 
exact rate of heat transfer cannot be known without knowledge of the 
distribution of drop diameters and their velocities relative to the sur-
rounding hot gases. However, by making reasonable guesses, one can 
show that all the heat can be transferred to water drops in times of the 
order of a few milliseconds. Cooling the products of an explosion by ten 
times on the absolute temperature scale will give correspondingly large 
reductions in the pressure and volume of gases. 
SOUND SPEED
The speed of sound in any medium is given by dividing the bulk mod-
ulus by the density and taking the square root. (The bulk modulus of 
a substance indicates how hard it is to reduce its volume by increasing 
pressure and is the ratio of an applied pressure to the resulting frac-
tional change in volume.)  Water at 15 degrees Celsius has a rather high 
bulk modulus of 2.05 x 109 newton per square meter and a density of 
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Figure 1. The speed of sound in mixtures of water and air as a function of the water/air ratio.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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999 kilogram per cubic meter, giving it a speed of sound of 1,432 meters 
per second. At the frequencies of sound and explosive waves, the bulk 
modulus of a gas is given by its pressure times the ratio of its specific 
heat at constant pressure and constant volume. This ratio is often given 
the symbol γ with the value 1.4 for diatomic gasses like air. The density 
of ambient air is about 1.22 kilogram per cubic meter giving it a speed of 
sound of 341 meters per second.
The speed of sound in a mixture of water and air is very interesting. 
A fifty-fifty mixture by volume would have double the bulk modulus of 
air (i.e., 283,640 newton per squared meter) and half the density of water 
(i.e., 499.5 kilogram per cubic meter).2 This mixture would have a speed 
of sound of only 23.8 meters per second, a factor of 17 down on normal 
speed in waterless air. Figure 1 shows a graph of the speed of sound in 
water/air mixtures as a function of water-to-air fraction. The effect is 
very strong for ratios between 0.03 and 0.97.
A video sequence of a water-suppressed explosion shows that the 
rate of advance of the spray front is very close to the velocities shown 
in Figure 1.
MOMENTUM TRANSFER
The conical geometry of a focal point charge can produce a slug of 
metal moving with a velocity that is considerably above the detonation 
velocity of the best explosives. The velocity is so high that a very thick 
armor plate can be penetrated. However, when such a projectile hits two 
bags of water, about the dimensions of a pillow, hanging on an easel 
made of domestic, hollow-core doors, the entire mass of water is blown 
out from the far side of the furthest pillow. Suppose that a slug weigh-
ing 0.1 kilogram is approaching the target at 10,000 meters per second. 
The momentum is 1,000 kilogram meters per second. This has to be con-
served. When the slug hits the front wall of a water bag, a positive pres-
sure wave with a spherical front propagates through the water. When 
this reaches the far side of the bag, there is an impedance mismatch be-
cause the mechanical properties of air and water are so different. This 
results in the reflection of the positive pressure wave as a negative front, 
but a liquid cannot sustain large negative pressures. The result is that 
water sprays out from the entire area of shock front. The process is re-
peated for the second bag.
If the momentum of the slug is transferred to a 100 kilogram mass of 
water, the water velocity needed to accept the momentum will be only 
10 meters per second. The water behaves like the executive desktop toy 
known as Newton’s cradle, which consists of a set of steel balls on pairs 
of strings swinging in a row. The intact slug in the shape of a carrot will 
be found very close to the easel position. Protection works because the 
expanding shock front transfers momentum to all the water.
FRAGMENT DRAG
Imagine that a steel munition case round has just exploded. The enor-
mous internal pressure causes cracks to appear between the munition’s 
case and the neighboring fragment at places chosen by the shell designer 
to produce the most damaging effect. A much lower pressure outside the 
casing and the large pressure difference means that the case has to do 
some serious acceleration. Meanwhile, explosive gases with a high den-
sity under the same pressure gradient are pouring through the gap be-
tween the case and the neighboring fragments giving high aerodynamic 
drag forces to increase acceleration even further. The casing’s shape is 
such that it will probably have a high drag coefficient.
Now imagine that the event is repeated with a large mass of water 
touching the outer wall of the case. As soon as the cracks open, the pres-
sure in the water outside rises very fast and quickly approaches the pres-
sure inside. With no pressure gradient, why should the munition bother 
to do any acceleration? The water from the outside of the enclosing bags 
can do it instead. Drops of water are held together by surface tension 
but movement relative to surrounding air creates a force to break them 
apart. This continues until they are very small and moving with almost 
the same velocity as the mixture of air and explosion products around 
them. If the water packing around the charge was incomplete and the 
round did acquire some velocity relative to the water around the muni-
tion case, the drag forces will be 800 times higher than if it were mov-
ing through air.
Parkes, Wilkinson, and O’Dwyer did experiments on howitzer shells 
at the Defence Research Agency (DRA) range at Shoeburyness using 
extremely sophisticated equipment for measuring fragment numbers 
and velocity. The results from two unsuppressed events at 6.05 me-
ters range and two suppressed events at 4.5 meters range are shown in 
Image 1.3 The fragment screens intercept only a small fraction (1.95% 
and 3.54% respectively) of the total number of fragments produced by 
the shell casing but, with an unsuppressed detonation, still enough to 
be statistically significant.
For both the unsuppressed shells, the velocity distribution shows 
three distinct clusters between 600 and 800 meters per second for rea-
sons so far unexplained. The two shells produced a total of 186 frag-
ments. However, even with a higher interception angle, there was only 
one fragment recorded from each of the suppressed events and both 
the velocities were about 100 meters per second. There were water bags 
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Figure 2. Fragment number and velocity from pairs of 155 mm M107 howitzer shells.
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around and above the shell but not below it. It is possible that the frag-
ments that escaped had moved downwards and bounced off the ground. 
The base plate of an artillery shell must be thick enough to withstand the 
high breech pressure, and there are accounts of intact base plates being 
thrown over the heads of observers 1,800 meters away from a shell burst. 
In the Shoeburyness trials, broken base plates from 155 to 200 mm sup-
pressed shells were found at the foot of the 18 millimeter plywood sup-
port of the velocity sensing screens.
Anyone who wishes to repeat the experiment but is not in possession 
of their own 155 mm howitzer shells and fragment-counting equipment 
can build a stockade out of four sheets of hardboard and cover a charge 
with a bag of granite chips from a garden center. Examination of the 
boards after firing will show many hundreds of penetrations. However 
with a 200 millimeter thickness of water bags above the granite chips 
there will not be a single penetration of the hardboard screens, and so 
the second part of the experiment can safely be tried at home.
CARBON COMBUSTION
Many explosives, TNT in particular, do not contain enough oxygen 
to react with all the other molecules. Consequently, an explosion gen-
erates a surplus of carbon in the form of a cloud of finely divided soot. 
Some of the energy in the soot cloud can still be useful if the carbon can 
take oxygen from air and act like a fuel-air explosion. This means that 
a negative oxygen balance is not regarded as a disadvantage. Alford has 
pointed out that the presence of water drops, water vapor, and lower 
temperatures could interfere with the secondary carbon-oxygen reac-
tion.4 This could provide yet another way for water to affect explosions. 
Evidence for this is that TNT explosions that have been suppressed 
leave behind sooty water but relatively clean air. There are many elec-
trostatic effects going on in an explosion and over short distances the 
forces between small, charged particles can be very strong. The water 
spray from a suppressed explosion is effective at trapping the dust from 
a building demolition.
PRACTICAL STRUCTURES
Suppression has now been tested with a wide 
range of charge weights and weapon casings up 
to a Mk 84 Paveway bomb with a 2,000 pound 
charge. Most of the practical work involves 
making a structure that can contain and sup-
port a large weight of water without itself gen-
erating dangerous fragments. The experiments 
show that it is wrong to try to contain water 
in any structure that itself might tend to con-
tain the explosion or to interfere with the out-
ward movement of spay. Achieving intimate 
contact between explosion products and water 
as quickly as possible is ideal. Water bags made 
from layflat polyethylene tube are satisfacto-
ry provided that the welding is given careful 
attention. Even with a thickness of 250 mi-
crons, they are sufficiently strong. A fit, rugby- 
playing Royal Logistics Corps major wearing 
steel-tipped combat boots could viciously attack 
a water-filled bag to no effect. Similarly, a tug-
of-war team could drag a filled bag over rough 
gravel without consequence.
An uneven thickness of water allows more 
ejecta along the direction of the thinner cover-
ing, hence a spherical water volume should be 
centered around the charge. A more practical 
hemispherical covering over a ground charge 
will increase ground shock, but this could perhaps be reduced by a sur-
rounding ditch. The key problem has been to build water bag structures 
with height. It is possible to draw systems in which the skin tension de-
fines the shape but it is difficult to control the shape of a partly filled 
structure. A water bag can roll down imperceptible slopes, and the in-
completely filled structures can show maddening behavior. Expanded 
polystyrene foam, glass-fiber tubes in the form of hollow rectangular 
A pair of water bags mounted on a chip-board easel. The HB 876 has a self-forging fragment that is ab-
solutely lethal and designed to knock out bulldozers as they attempt to fill in bomb craters on runways. 
The weapon functions when tipped over and sends the self-forging fragment through the bulldozer 
blade, engine, and the operator. The weapon carries many smaller “pea charges” for AP effect. In the 
trial, the fragment was actually shattered and its pieces were recovered from the ground at the foot of 
the range’s safety blocks. No damage was occasioned to the blocks. Self-forging fragments are used in 
many roadside bombs and kill tanks and armored vehicles (and their crews) with ease.
Image 2. Saddle bag and polystyrene construction.
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beams, cling-film, nets, and the cheapest domestic doors with an inter-
nal paper honeycomb filling placed edge on are all suitable supports be-
cause they disintegrate into very light particles. Boyer et al. developed a 
neat basket made from geo-textile mat shaped like a hat with a high rim 
to support water bags and replicated the Shoeburyness trials with gre-
nades and mortar shells.5
For larger structures, Dell Explosives laid duplex water bags so that 
they straddled a block of expanded polystyrene like saddle-bags over a 
horse and then filled each bag through a hole at the top. The arrange-
ment is shown in Image 2. This method allows walls with overlapping 
bags and an airspace between them. Roofs can be made by laying saddle-
bags over thin-walled, rectangular-section hollow tubes that are long 
enough to act as roof beams. The combination of walls and roofs allows 
the construction of habitats in which large weapons can be made safe in 
the knowledge that any unintended, high-order event (which occurs at 
about 10% of disposals) will be safely contained within a much shorter 
evacuation distance than required for an unsuppressed explosion.
While fragment stopping suggests that complete water coverage is de-
sirable close to a weapon casing, the reduction of the speed of sound in 
water/air mixtures suggests that it might be useful to include some air 
deliberately in the outer region of the water volume. Polyethylene bub-
ble pack can be used but has an inconveniently large buoyancy. The most 
satisfactory construction for walls, now supplied by Dell Explosives, 
uses bales of straw cased in polythene bags made from layflat polythene 
tubing. The unfilled bales are very light, far lighter than filled sandbags, 
so that structures are quick to build around objects like the bases of 
wind turbines. Holes for water pipes are then stabbed through the up-
per surface of each wrapped bale to allow filling from a hose. Each bale 
can hold 100 kilograms of water. Additional structural integrity can be 
obtained by wrapping the walls with a belt of cling film. There is the 
further advantage that while it is tedious to clean up thousands of frag-
ments of expanded polystyrene after a suppressed explosion, the straw 
residues are biodegradable. More permanent structures for long-term 
storage of explosives in crowded sites can be made from polystyrene 
with water-filled polythene inserts. 
For the many hundreds of thousands of suppressions needed for 
the disposal of surplus munitions, even the consumption of polythene 
would be undesirable. A team at the University of Edinburgh designed 
and carried out initial, small-scale testing of water mortars resembling 
giant water pistols driven by compressed air that would be placed in a 
ring around a charge. Twenty tonnes of water would converge from all 
directions just as the charge was fired and the cycle would be repeated 
every few minutes.
CONCLUSIONS
Water bags are now in service for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
and civilian demolition adjacent to valuable installations. The reduction 
in safety distances and evacuation numbers can provide large savings.
Water suppresses explosions by the
• Rapid cooling of explosion products because of the large surface 
area of spray.
• Reduction of sound velocity in water/air mixtures to a few tens of 
meters per second.
• Transfer of the momentum of a fast projectile to the entire water 
mass.
• Rapid rise of pressure on the outside of a fragmenting weapon 
casing.
• Increase of drag of fragments in water because of its higher density.
• Suppression of soot combustion in low-oxygen explosives.
To put numerical values on the possible factors listed above, re-
searchers should measure the number, velocity, temperature, and size- 
distribution of drops inside the expanding water-air mix.
Structures to contain water must not impede the rapid mixing of 
water and gasses. They must not themselves present any fragmentation 
hazard. Achieving height is the chief difficulty. 
Polythene bags, expanded polystyrene foam, low-density domestic 
doors, nets, geo-textile baskets, hollow glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) 
tubes, and straw bales in polythene are all suitable materials. 
Water and straw are cheap, rapid to erect with small teams, and bio-
degradable. For the continuous, production-line suppression needed 
for disposal of unused weapons, large volumes of spray can be gener-
ated by water mortars.
The authors hope that water and water bags with the right support-
ing structures will make life for both civilian and military explosives 
engineers much less exciting.  
See endnotes page 63
As presented at the UK Explosives Mitigation Workshop, RCMS 
Shrivenham, 19 June 2002.
Stephen Salter
Institute for Energy Systems, School of Engineering
University of Edinburgh, Scotland 
Stephen Salter served an apprenticeship as 
aircraft fitter, tool-maker, and instrumenta-
tion engineer at Saunders Roe before doing a 
degree in Natural Sciences at the University 
of Cambridge. He has worked on mechanics 
and electronics for robotics in artificial intel-
ligence, mine clearance, renewable energy 
from sea waves and tidal streams, and now the 
hardware for marine cloud brightening to reverse global warming. He is 
emeritus Professor of Engineering Design at the University of Edinburgh. 
John Parkes
John Parkes joined the British army in 1963 at 
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http:/jmu.edu/cisr/research/cwd-repository.shtml
The repository is a free, publicly accessible document  
storage and sharing tool for material related to convention-
al weapons destruction and mine action. It will also serve as a 
means to preserve the valuable history of mine action and CWD 
efforts for future practitioners and researchers.
CWDGLOBAL REPOSITORY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY • EOD Research and  
Development
• Advocacy and  
International Law
• Conventional Weapons 
Stockpile Destruction
• Risk Education
• Victim Assistance
The Global CWD Repository benefits both the 
field and your organization! 
Submitting materials is simple:
• Easy-to-use online form, includes searchable abstract,  
authors and keywords
• Upload a PDF or Microsoft Word document (scanned  
documents saved as PDFs are acceptable)  
• Your organization retains copyright!
Take a look online or contribute  
to the Global CWD Repository:  
t    
t    
t    
t    
t    
t    
t    
t    
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ENDNOTES
PPE Development and Needs in HMA by Smith [ from page 5]
1. NATO Standardization Agency (STANAG) 2920 PPS (edition 2) Ballistic test method for Personal Armor Materials and Combat Clothing, NSA/0723-PPS/2920, 2003.
2. The author has tested 5mm untreated polycarbonate using NATO STANAG 2920 and found a V50 ranging from 250 m/s to 280 m/s. The uncertain result is probably 
caused by variations in the ambient temperature or in the temperature of the fragments (which were fired using blanks or by compressed air).
3. Hand-tools are included in IMAS 10.30 PPE because the accident record shows that the use of well designed tools can protect the deminer by distance and by avoiding 
parts of the tool separating and causing injury.
4. PURE is a polypropylene self-reinforced composite material: see http://www.ditweaving.com/ 
5. This visor was designed by the author and given freely to the manufacturer: See: Security Devices. “SD Platinum Visor.” Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghH7B. 
6. The author was invited to advise during a workshop in Norway at the start of the design process for this mask, but does not like the result. For information about the 
mask, see: Rofi: Protecting People. Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghUrp.  
7. European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Workshop Agreement 15756, now defunct.
8. IMAS 10.30, 2nd Edition, amendment 2, “References to CWA for T&E of PPE were removed from Clause1 and Annex A” at the start of 2011.
9. The author was an advisor to the project.
10. From IMAS 04.10, Glossary, 2014. This definition is drawn from the International Standards Organization (ISO) Guide 51:1999(E).
11. Left to right, the pictures show a UNADP deminer in Mozambique a HALO Trust and a MAG deminer in Cambodia.
12. Pictures taken in 2017 during specialist IED clearance training conducted in Syria by PCM ERW Risk Management & MAT Kosovo. www.pcm-erw.com, email: info@
pcm-erw.com. 
13. Lebanon NMAS 04.10 Glossary, February, 2018.
14. Drafted by the LMAC with the author’s input, 2018.
15. The most successful of which in terms of sales is the DOK-ING MV4 made in Croatia (which has also supplied U.S. forces in Afghanistan). 
16. IMAS 10.30 PPE, Edition 1, 2001. “The frontal protection ensemble provided to employees, whether required to kneel, sit or squat shall be designed to cover the eyes, 
throat (frontal neck), chest, abdomen and genitals”.
17. IMAS 10.30 2nd Edition, 2008.
18. As a member of the IMAS Review Board, the author argued for this change because of the lack of injuries sustained while wearing goggles while excavating with rakes. 
The wearing of blast goggles during EOD and IED tasks has since become common, which was not anticipated but the author respects the principle of wearer’s choice 
as long as blast visors are available at the task if they choose to wear them. 
19. For a formal HMA Field Risk Assessment training course, the author recommends the one that he provided some materials for at GICHD. Contact: r.evans@gichd.org
20. Database of Demining Accidents, which is an informative reference in IMAS 10.30, (Annex A) and online at www.ddasonline.com.
21. International Mine Action Standards Technical Note for Mine Action (IMAS TNMA) TN 10.20 20 2009.
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Advanced Geophysical Classification of WWII-era Unexploded Bombs Using Borehole Electromagnetics by Beran and Billings [ from page 12 ]
1. Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP), and Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP). “Munitions 
Response.” Accessed 11 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2qnj9zP. 
2. Beran, L., B.C. Zelt, and S. D. Billings. “Detecting and Classifying UXO.” Journal of ERW and Mine Action 17.1 (2013): 57-62. Accessed 11 April 2018. https://bit.
ly/2qoIF7Q. 
3. “Theater History of Operations (THOR) Data: World War II.” Data.world. Accessed 11 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2EEghmu. 
4. Holm, C. “Germany's WWII Duds Get Deadlier.” Spiegel Online (2012). Accessed 11 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2EE4O6r. 
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(2004) 1241-1251.
Lessons from the Past: The Rapid Clearance of Denmark’s Minefields in 1945 by Evans [ from page 19 ] 
1. See Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i December 1945, paragraph 1-3, p. 1-2 for how much land was contaminated. See also Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-
Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift for Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. p. 136. The figure of 1000 km² with only 10% actually containing mines is given. 
This is remarkably close to the proportion of modern pattern minefield CHA that is often eventually cleared using land release best practice.
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2. Beretning over Mine- og Sprängkommandoens Arbejde I Tiden fra 10.05.1945 -  22.12.1947. p.7 
3. https://web.archive.org/web/20070517235645/http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/germsurr.shtml 
4. Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift for Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. p. 134
5. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i December 1945, paragraph 4, p.2
6. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i december 1945, paragraph 4, p.2 A follow on organization, Sprengkommando Dänemark started to be formed in 
August 1945 and continued until July 1947. See Zusammenfassender Bericht, p.1
7. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i december 1945, paragraph 4, p.2
8. Beretning over Mine- og Sprängkommandoens Arbejde I Tiden fra 10.05.1945 -  22.12.1947. p.1
9. Footage of Major Holland and Hauptman Geuer discussing the minefields of the Skallingen peninsula in Jutland can be found at http://www.sculptingthepast.dk/
Film-oversigt/Besaettelsen/Livsfare---Miner.aspx 
10. Orientering vedrørende ‘Minekommando Dänemark’”, 18 June 1945. 
11. Orientering vedrørende ‘Minekommando Dänemark’”, 18 June 1945.
12. Arbeitsplan für das Räuman von Minen auf der Halbinsel Skalling. Pionier-bataillon 1060, Minenkommando Dänmark, pp.2-3.
13. http://www.sculptingthepast.dk/Film-oversigt/Besaettelsen/Livsfare---Miner.aspx
14. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i december 1945, paragraph 1, p.1 See also Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift for 
Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. p. 142
15. The best post war demining records were probably kept by the Draeger Brigade in the Netherlands in 1945. The Brigade, commanded by Wehrmacht Engineer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Draeger, had over 3300 men who were, as in Denmark, self-administered and were largely left to get on with the job. The records the Brigade kept 
could not be matched by many national authorities and a number of operators today. In six months 1’162’458 mines were cleared (60% AP/40% AT). Booby traps were 
fitted to 1.4% of mines. Email from Antoon Meijers, author of Achtung Minen, 14 February 2018. See also Antoon Meijers, Achtung  Minen - Danger Mines, Het rui-
men van landmijnen in Nederland 1940-1947 (Soesterberg, 2013), pp. 138-139. On average 100 mines were lifted for every sixty two man hours. Of the 3300 men, 179 
were killed and 381 injured. Records were kept of what mines caused what casualties. Schu mines had a fatality rate of 2%, S-mines31% and all AT mines 60%. Again 
many national authorities and operators would be unable to produce equivalent figures for the last 25 years of mine action. See Military Operational Research Unit 
Report no. 7: Battle Study, Minefield Clearance and Casualties. Date: 03 May 1946. Stichting Geschiedkundige Verzameling EOD, Netherlands.  
16. Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift for Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. Appendix 1.
17. Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift for Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. Appendix 2.
18. Email from Dan Mouritzsen, 10 February 2018
19. Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift for Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. p. 133 – 152
20. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i december 1945, paragraph 4, pp.2-3 See also Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift 
for Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. p. 146
21. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i december 1945, paragraph 4, pp.2-3
22. http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2773&context=cisr-journal
23. Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Article 52. 
24. Email from Antoon Meijers, author of Achtung Minen, 14 February 2018. See also Antoon Meijers, Achtung  Minen - Danger Mines, Het ruimen van landmijnen in 
Nederland 1940-1947 (Soesterberg, 2013), pp. 138-139 
25. Croll M. Landmines in War and Peace: From Their Origins to the Present Day. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2009; 100
26. https://www.halotrust.org/media-centre/news/halo-ceo-calls-for-action-on-landmines/
27. John Jensen,  Der er mere Under Sandet – minerydningen efter besættelsen.
28. In Holland the British and Canadians calculated that “well recorded minefields were cleared at about three times the rate of poorly or unrecorded ones.” Military 
Operational Research Unit Report no. 7: Battle Study, Minefield Clearance and Casualties. Date: 03 May 1946. P.3 Stichting Geschiedkundige Verzameling EOD, 
Netherlands.  In the modern day context the multiple is likely to be even greater.
29. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i december 1945, paragraph 2, p.1
30. Hovedpunkter til Orientering for Pressen ved Møde i December 1945, paragraph 3, p.2
31. Small groups of German Surrendered Enemy Personnel stayed until 1948, the last leaving in October that year. Their duties involved “call outs” to mines and ERW. 
Dienstgruppe Dänemark Rapport, 1948, pp 12-14.
32. Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the use of Stockpliling, Production and transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction, Denmark, 21 June 2012. Para 4, p.1
33. Kaptajn D.A.Wieth-Knudsen, Minerydning i Danmark, “Tidsskrift for Ingeniørofficerer” 14. Aargang. p. 148. See also Letter from Oversergent Frost tp 
Pionerkommandoet 21 September 1945, papa ad.a.4.p.5
34. http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2773&context=cisr-journal 
35. Email from Martin Jebens to the author, 09 February 2018.
36. Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the use of Stockpliling, Production and transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction, Denmark, 21 June 2012. Para 4, p.1 and Annex I p.7 
37. Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty involves transparency measures that, among other things, include the accurate recording of all mined areas. Ideally it would require 
recording of individual landmine locations. This best practice is now normal amongst leading operators who use this information to better inform and guide subse-
quent survey and clearance.
Minefield Sketch Maps in Humanitarian Mine Action by Hamlin and Jaupi [ from page 34 ]
1. Selective Availability. GPS.gov. https://bit.ly/2HY57v3. Accessed 27 February 2018.
2. Georeferencing. Esri GIS Dictionary. https://bit.ly/2py47Gn. Accessed 22 February 2018.
3. Cambodia: 25 years making their communities safer. Relief Web. 14 December 2016. https://bit.ly/2Gd5c0O. Accessed 21 March 2018. 
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Mitigating Adverse Environmental Impacts in Mine Action by Jebens and Maspoli [ from page 40 ]
1. “IMAS 10.70- Safety & occupational health- Protection of the environment.” Mine Action Standards. Last modified June 2013. http://bit.ly/2Bv1JUK.
2. Weir, Doug. “UN Passes First Ever Resolution On Conflict Pollution.” Toxic Remnants of War Network, 7 December 2017. http://bit.ly/2rCEmca.
3. Hofmann Ursign, Rapillard, Pascal. “Post-Conflict Mine Action: Environment and Law”. In Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017: 396-419, p. 399.
4. Hofmann Ursign, Rapillard, Pascal. “Post-Conflict Mine Action: Environment and Law”. Op. cit. p. 401.
5. “Sustainable Development Agenda.” Sustainable Development Goals. United Nations. Accessed 9 October 2017. http://bit.ly/1EsnO1l. 
6. “Leaving No One Behind: Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals.” GICHD UNDP. February 2017. http://bit.ly/2pbCIZJ
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Determining the Value of UAVs in Iraq by Alford, Curran, and Cole [ from page 51 ]
1. A defect in an image cause by differences in positions in a camera.
2. 4K is 3840x2160, while is 2.7K is 2704x1520.
WHY IS WATER SO EFFICIENT AT SUPPRESSING THE EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIONS? BY SALTER AND PARKES [ FROM PAGE 56 ]
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5. Bowyer P.K., Hearn F, Morgan D, Stockdale A and Wight F. Mitigation of Blast and Fragmentation for Projectiles up to 155mm Using Water Based Tamping. Final re-
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the wider HMA community to mitigate future threats while improving opera-
tional eﬃ  ciency? What steps are HMA organizations taking to circumvent these 
threats? Possible discussion points include funding, improvised explosive devic-
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government institutions, information management systems, extending HMA ef-
forts to rebuild communities, understanding and addressing asymmetrical tac-
tics, and maintaining physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) best 
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The explosive contamination left behind by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
continues to pose a signiﬁ cant threat to regional security and post-conﬂ ict re-
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sons learned can we pass on to the rest of the community? Are there measures 
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IEDs? How do the weapons’ means of construction, emplacement, and initia-
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proliferation of ammunition due to poor (PSSM) practices at arms depots, high-
light the need for increased international cooperation to combat these threats. Is 
more widespread application of the International Ammunition Technical Guide-
lines (IATG) the solution? What can be done to make the IATG more user-friendly 
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ganizations that conduct safe and secure management of ammunition translate 
their experience into lessons learned that serve the broader community?
The Journal editorial staﬀ  reserves the right to reject submissions that include text copied 
from other sources in part or as a whole. Works that have been published previously and for 
which the author retains publishing rights may be submitted, but The Journal requires the 
author provide notiﬁ cation of this when submitting the article and give contact information 
for the original publisher so that reprint permission may be veriﬁ ed. Reprint submissions for 
which this information is not provided may be rejected. Please note that The Journal reserves 
all rights to content published and requires notiﬁ cation and written approval before content 
is used again by another source or publication.
Authors who submit articles to The Journal are expected to do so in good faith and are 
solely responsible for the content therein, including the accuracy of all information and 
correct attribution for quotations and citations. 
Issue 22.2 
Publication: Summer 2018
The Journal invites government bodies, nongovernmental organizations, military 
personnel, researchers, academics and industry experts to contribute their arti-
cles or case studies. We are actively looking for theoretical and practice-based 
non-promotional contributions.
IN EVERY ISSUE
Subscribe to The Journal: 
www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/subscribe.shtml
Field Notes: This section of The Journal features articles, case 
studies, and experiences by practitioners and subject-matter 
experts. Field Notes accepts articles on a variety of subjects on 
a rolling basis.
U.S. Department of State
SUBMIT ALL MATERIALS TO:
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
(formerly The Journal of ERW and Mine Action)
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University,
800 S. Main Street, MSC 4902
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Phone: +1 540 568 2503
Email: cisr-journal@jmu.edu
Website: jmu.edu/cisr
For complete submission guidelines, please visit 
www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/guidelines.shtml
Risk education to children in Iraq.
Photo courtesy of NPA.
64
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss1/1
